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The task of this research is to explore the
relationship between arms control i d national
security. The author suggests that national security
issues must dominate arms control initiatives and that
the military command establishment should have an
expanded role in shaping current arms control
initiatives. The author considers two case studies to
analyze this relationship. The first case study
involves cruise missiles and reveals how issues such as
politics, budgets, military missions, technology,
stability and verification can impact on arms control
negotiations and national security. The second case
study shows the control that the military can and
should exert in areas dealing with both arms control
and national security interests. Lastly, the author
proposes how the balance of arms control and national




II. RELATIONSHIP OF ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 6
A. CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 6
B. FOUNDATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL 10
III. CRUISE MISSILE: A CASE STUDY 16
A. CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT 17
B. POLITICS / BUREAUCRACIES 18
C. BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS 21




H. THE SALT ENVIRONMENT 37
I. SALT II 41
1. Discussion 41
2. CRUISE MISSILE: SALT II Analysis . . 44
J. SALT CONCLUSIONS 48
IV. STRATEGIC EMPHASIS AREAS 53
A. C-CUBED: A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 55
B. OBJECTIVES OF A STRATEGIC C-CUBED .... 57
C. ENVIRONMENTAL C-CUBED FACTORS 59
D. COMPONENTS OF THE C-CUBED SYSTEM .... 64
E. C-CUBED SYSTEMS: MANAGEMENT 67
V. CRITICAL CONCEPTS 70
A. TECHNOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT 70
B. DETERRENCE 74
C. STABILITY: SURVIVABILITY / CAPABILITY . . 76
D. BALANCED OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
STRATEGIC DOCTRINE 80
E. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE 87
F. REFLECTIONS 91
LIST OF REFERENCES 93





The author's purpose is to explore some of the
issues and perspectives that an officer must be
conceptually fluent in to be effective and
knowledgeable in the arms control arena. The author
also intends to demonstrate that the military command
establishment should have an expanded role in shaping
current arms control initiatives. Three research
questions lay the basis for this effort.
1. What factors must the military command
establishment recognize and contend with, in
order to properly understand and influence arms
control proceedings?
2. Do arms control initiatives support U.S.
strategic security policies?
3. Does the military command structure have a
legitimate interest in and a position to
influence arms control initiatives?
An underlying premise of this paper is that there
should be an informed military perspective regarding
arms control. In reality, there exists numerous arms
control perspectives expressed by factions from the
nuclear freeze movement to more traditional
governmental organizations. The variety of views are
best illustrated by looking at some of the more
conventional arms control perspectives.
1. The "diplomatic perspective" views arms control
negotiations as a process of communication,
with an emphasis on problem solving through
discussion. There is an effort to keep the
dialogue going at all times. Indeed, the
proponents of the "diplomatic perspective"
have a philosophy of treating one's opponents
more as clients than adversaries.
2. The "legal perspective" views arms control as a
subordinate concern. This persuasion believes
that world peace will ensue from world law.
Thus arms control concerns will naturally be
achieved as world law is defined, accepted, and
adhered to.
3. The "State Department" perspective views arms
control initiatives as a way to relax tensions
through negotiations. Here the idea is that
one agreement will lead to another. In this
process the content of the agreements should
also increase in substance.
4. The "strategic planner" perspective views arms
control initiatives in terms of how they
affect resources and impact on goals and
policy.
5. The "military" perspective views arms control
initiatives in terms of achieving national
security objectives. [Ref. 1]
One could argue that all the perspectives seek
national security. They do, but at a price that may
ultimately cost the United States the security it
seeks. The "legal perspective" has an orientation and
fundamental belief in law. The arms control compliance
record leaves this theory gravely in doubt. The "State
Department" and "diplomatic" views see arms control as
a "means" whereby improved relations can be achieved.
In essence, these fractions see national security being
derived from "better relations". It also leads to a
great deal of linkage of issues that may be completely
divorced from arms control or national security
concerns. Lastly, the "strategic planner" perspective
is one concerned with "after the fact calculations".
This leaves only the "military" to act effectively
without linkage or other motives in achieving national
security goals, through arms control. This of course
presupposes that arms control is a means and not an end
in and of itself. As described the "military"
perspective seems to provide the purest view on arms
control issues. It is with that perspective that the
author continues this paper.
At a recent symposium of the National Security
Affairs Institute, which met to discuss defense
planning and arms control, it was concluded:
That the lack of consensus in arms control anddefense planning is an outgrowth of a more basic,
potentially debilitating problem - an absence of
general agreement on the broad outlines of a
coherent national ^strategy to achieve US security
objectives [Ref. 2].
This being the case, the basis of the United States'
national security position will be initially introduced
followed by a discussion of the original premises of
arms control. Once this foundation is laid two case
studies will be introduced. A case study concerning the
cruise missile development will be used to show how
political, military and arms control policies can
exhibit a disharmony. This case study also allows for
a historical review of the significant agreements of
SALT I & II. Next, a case study concerning strategic
command, control, and communications (C-cubed) will
demonstrate the approach needed to secure the national
security of the United States. Both case studies and
concluding comments will highlight the parameters that
surround present arms control negotiations.
Colin Gray expounded on the foundations of arms
control saying that arms control was envisioned to be
in complete harmony military initiatives. Thus arms
control theory was to be blended with military actions
and be an extension of military strategy In securing
national security and peace [Ref. 3].
This harmony of military and arms control issues
has in the past been questioned. Alexander Vershbow,
expressed the opinion that at times military rationales
may be in direct conflict with arms control rationales.
He concludes when this happens that arms control
rationales should take precedence. He selected as an
example of this collision of rationales the case of the
cruise missile saying,
Thus while military and financial rationales for
the cruise missiles may be persuasive, from an arms
control perspective there can be no Justification
This intriguing if not disturbing statement shows
how far perspectives have changed from the original
concept of arms control as a means to support military
efforts to secure national security and peace.
The above quote clearly shows the mental
distinction often made that separates arms control and
military thinking. Such divisiveness can only diminish
the United States' effectiveness in securing national
security goals. Championing the opposite perspective
is the Reagan administration. It has begun the START
process, claiming arms control treaties are not
sufficient in and of themselves. The Administration has
tried to reunite sound military principles with arms
control measures, which allow for the accomplishment of
United States national security goals. The
administration finds this position challenged daily,
with increased pressure from certain political and
public elements. The pressure seems to originate from
traditional wariness of military control and also in
the fear that surrounds nuclear warfare and the
devastation it can cause.
This situation should be the cause of great
concern for U.S. military officers. The military must
exercise all legal influences as the guardian of U.S.
national security. Those in the service, while charged
to carry out the orders of those appointed over them,
possess a potential to influence national security
interests through strategic programs as well as through
strategic command, control and communication (C-cubed)
systems
.
II . RELATIONSHIP OF ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
This chapter will lay a foundation for considering
the relationship between arms control and national
security. It will define what is currently United
States security policy and strategic doctrine. That
basis established, the purposes of arms control will be
discussed, both in its historic and contemporary
context
.
A. CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
It must be realized that U.S. national security
goals are but a subset of U.S. national interests. It
is, however, the basis that supports and defends U.S.
interests if threatened from within or without. The
Department of Defense is charged to ensure the
military Is capable of meeting U.S. national security
goals. Initially, those goals are centered in a
posture aimed at deterring aggression at any level.
Should deterrence fall, the military must be prepared
to terminate hostilities individually or in concert
with U.S. allies, ensuring limited damage to the U.S.
and her allies.
This charge of defending U.S. national interests as
given to the military must be maintained with
consistency. Consistency can be extremely difficult to
maintain given the frequency of Presidential elections.
A change in administration often leads to the "clean
slate" phenomenon in U.S. politics. These fresh
perspectives, views, approaches, and programs can have
important repercussions affecting the consistency with
which the military defends U.S. national interests.
The military must not only provide for defense against
hostile elements, but has a responsibility to ensure
consistency of purpose in the defense realm.
The current Administration has six major national
security objectives. These are documented in Secretary
of Defense Caspar Weinberger's Annual Report to the
Congress Fiscal Year 1988 and include:
1. The ability to safeguard the United
States, its forces and allies by
deterring aggression and coercion. If
deterrence fails then to fight,
ultimately ending the conflict on
favorable terms to the United States.
2. Encourage and assist our allies in
defending themselves.
3. Ensure that the United States has
access to critical resources.
4. Where possible reduce the USSR's
influence
.
5. Prevent military and critical technology
transfers to the Soviet Bloc.
6. Pursue equitable and verifiable arms
reduction agreements. The Administration
holds that compliance is a key concern in
the signing of any international
• agreement. In view of the Soviet record
of violations, fully effective verification
plays a most vital part of any agreement.
[Ref. 5]
These goals do not speak of specific force
structures, but serve as principles of policy. These
principles however, do indirectly dictate a force
structure capable of carrying out the principles. Thus
the question must be asked, what level of force should
the United States military have? In the report
previously cited a guideline measure was given: "Our
military strength must not be, nor appear to be
inferior to that of the Soviet Union." [Ref. 5:p. 16]
For U.S. forces to be effective they must be tailored
by U.S. principles as well with respect to potential
enemy forces, specifically those of the Soviet Union
and her satellites. A prudent American defense policy
cannot rest on theories of Soviet motivation, but must
respond to the facts of Soviet policy and military
capability. Unfortunately, a net assessment shows the
Soviets increasing their conventional and strategic
force structures [Ref. 6]. There is a natural division
of forces, those being of a conventional nature and
those of a strategic nature. This paper does not have
the scope to discuss the conventional force structure,
thus only strategic forces will be discussed.
It should be noted that United States strategic
doctrine envisions sufficient strategic forces to deter
conventional and strategic attack against attacks
directed at the United States and her allies [Ref. 5:p.
25]. This calls for a doctrine of employment which is
currently known as Counterforce ( CF ) targeting. This,
as well as other strategies, will be discussed later in
more detail. It is sufficient to say that this
doctrine calls for U.S. strategic forces to be
survivable and capable of hitting what the United
States considers the Soviet leadership values most. It
also requires flexibility to be a deterrent in a
variety of situations. [Ref. 5:p. 25]
Current Soviet actions in the strategic realm act
not only to deter attack but to erode the deterrent
character of U.S. strategic forces. They seek to make
United States' strategic forces less secure against
attack and less effective in response. This will be
shown in the case study of the cruise missiles and in a
systems discussion of the vulnerability and importance
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of the United States C-cubed system. The strategic C-
cubed system being
A less publicized, but perhaps even more important
part of our strategic modernization program (which)
serves to improve the survivability of our command,
control, communications. and intelligence systems.
The improved survivability of these systems helps
to deter a nuclear attack designed to incapacitate
the U.S. National Command Authorities (NCA) and
their control^over U.S. nuclear forces.[Ref. 5:p. 28]
The above quote shows that the present
Administration does not only seek the improvement of
weapon systems, that are the cutting edge of United
States strategic strike forces. The Administration
also seeks progress in supportive programs and
doctrinal changes needed to realize U.S. strategic
goals. There are great strides being attempted in
programs that support strategic doctrine. It must be
remembered that strategy is not concerned with the
application of force alone but also involves stratagem,
that will overcome enemy resistance. The present
Administration envisions changes to the basic strategic
strategy of the United States. The new proposed
strategy is based more on a balanced offensive and
defensive doctrine, which is a possibility if the
Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
becomes a technical and political reality. This topic
will be more thoroughly considered later in the paper.
Presently it is sufficient to say that, the
Administration's stated purpose for SDI is:
When these efforts come to fruition, we can move
away from an almost exclusive reliance on, and
attention to, offensive strategic forces. ^To the
extent that defenses render offensive forces
ineffective, any temptation the Soviet rulers might
feel to use their offensive forces would be
overcome, not simply by their calculations about
the prospect and effects of our retaliation, but
by an assessment that their attack would be
unsuccessful to begin with. [Ref. 6:p. 28]
Later, when this initiative will be discussed, the
reader will have the background necessary to better
understand the ramifications of the Administration's
endorsement of such a concept.
This concludes a concise look at the United States'
strategic force structure and the progressive strategic
policies and goals being sought by the present
Administration. This portion of the paper should allow
for an appreciation of current national security
issues. This will facilitate comparing strategic
security interests with the stated goals of arms
control
.
B. FOUNDATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL
As listed in the last section, arms control makes a
qualified entry into what was listed as the sixth
point, of the stated six major national security goals
of the present Administration. Not everyone would
agree with such a placement. Edward Rowny , a key
figure in the United States arms control delegation of
the SALT era, has said in retrospect:
You note I have had little to say about arms
control. I have done this because my six and one-
half years with SALT have led me to the conclusion
that we have put too much emphasis on the control
of arms and too little on the provisions of arms.
It has been a profound mistake for the United
States to make arms control the centerpiece of its
foreign policy. The Soviet Union has not done so
and has profited from our folly. The Soviets have
their priorities straight. First, they determine
their national objectives and foreign policy goals.
Then they develop and deploy the forces needed to
carry out these objectives and goals. Finally, and
only in third priority, they see where and if
controls or limitation of ^arms can be accepted
which fit into this scheme. [Ref. 2:p. 52]
This perspective should weigh heavily in military
minds, as the protectors of the profession of arms.
At a recent Hoover Institute symposium, the position
was put forward that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
should handle arms control Issues for the United
States. This might facilitate the classical harmony of
military doctrine and arms control positions as
initially envisioned. [Ref. 2:p. 8]
Many would argue that the present Administration
would agree with Mr Rowny ' s philosophy of reducing the
significance of arms control discussions. If this is
true then why does arms control initiatives occupy one
of the six major national security goals of the current
Administration?
The answer may be found in political necessity and
as such the Administration has gone to great lengths to
describe conditions that would allow for signing future
arms control agreements. Consequently, the
Administration's current Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(IXF) arms control initiatives must be viewed as in
accordance with the Administration's stated pre-
conditions of "equitable and verifiable" agreements
"that will enhance deterrence and stability at lower
force levels". [Ref. 5:pp. 42, 62]
There is a definite belief that the United States
has at times put aims of achieving an agreement ahead
of the terms of the agreement Itself. This being done
largely for political advantage or to answer political
pressure. The Reagan Administration has leveled such
accusations when discussing the "flawed nature" of the
SALT I & II agreements. The following statement
summarizes the Administration's views.
We have no doubt whatever that it is far better to
wait for real reductions rather than seek easy
political a"CTri3im by signing arms agreements
[Ref. 5:p. 63].
The SALT arms agreements in the administration's
eyes were
...purported "arms control agreements" (which)
actually legitimized the buildup in Soviet
capabilities. The Soviets counted on exploiting
America's faith in the arms control process, and
our deep desire to reduce the risk of war, to
inhibit a U.S. response to the shift in the balance
of power. In addition, the Soviets were able to
forestall a U.S. response to their treaty
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noncompliance by veiling their activities In
secrecy, then counting on our domestic politics and
our public opinion to keep the issues clouded in
ambiguity for years. [Ref. 5:p. 62]
In discussing arms control it is important not to
have any illusions about the motives or the stakes
involved. One of the most poignant and concise
statements the author has found concerning arms control
is the following:
Any discussion of arms control is a discussion of
possible U.S. -Soviet cooperation regarding(strategic) systems and procedures that exist in
the first place because of the mistrust between the
two countries" [Ref. 7].
The above quote points to the dilemma of seeking
agreement in arms control between two nations locked in
superpower conflict a situation which has given birth,
cradled, and natured all nuclear weapons as they exist
today. Certainly there exists a continual air of
mistrust between these powers as evidenced in reports
of non-compliance, other public statements, and arms
control bargaining positions. If this is the case, why
have arms control at all? While there exist numerous
listings and explanations concerning what arms control
seeks to accomplish, most of these can be compressed to
a simple list such as follows:
1. Minimize the risk of nuclear war;
2. Reduce destruction if war does break out;
and
3. Reduce the cost of preparing for and
conducting nuclear warfare.
The above listing, in its generic form, seems to
support national security objectives, as they have been
reviewed previously. Point 1: minimizing the risk of
nuclear war correlates with the national security
objective of deterring aggression. Point 2: reduce
destruction if war does break out is in harmony with
U.S. security goals of ending conflicts in favorable
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terms to the U.S. and ensuring access to vital
resources. Point 3: reducing the cost of preparing for
and conducting nuclear war can be paired with the U.S.'
interest of verifiable arras reductions. This
correlation of arms control aims and U.S. national
security goals is by nature one sided. Soviet military
aims matched against the arms control aims would be one
sided, as well. It is only when arms control aims are
taken as paramount that negotiated outcomes may not
support military policies. Arms control was initially
envisioned to be in harmony with military needs. Today
however, the application of arms control principles in
the negotiation process has often seen them diluted and
distorted from a national security perspective.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has expressed
views saying arms control agreements should diminish
the risks of war and help reduce the threat to U.S.
security and that of U.S. allies. He went on to say
that cosmetic agreements that merely legitimize a
further buildup of Soviet military power are not in the
U.S. national interest. [Ref. 8] Sorrels and other
contemporary arms control authors often point out that
arms control objectives which harmonize with a
country's military doctrine are at times served best by
unilateral measures as much as arms control agreements.
There Is recognition that arms control agreements may
at times be detrimental to national security objectives
and certain arms control objectives as well. Thus,
they warn that arms control should never become a means
unto itself. Fundamental objectives such as minimizing
war, reducing the destruction of war should it erupt,
reducing costs of defense and arms competition,
enhancing stability, and discouraging proliferation all
13
must be calculated to and in harmony with national
security goals. [Ref. 9]
In the coming pages, and especially in the cruise
missile case study, these issues will be addressed.
What is clear is when President Kennedy created the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in September 196 1,
there was no thought that national security goals and
arms control could be out of harmony with each another.
It is a hypothesis of the author that arms control
through the SALT era is a prime example of this
disunity. Hopefully, an analysis of that era may make
a difference in future decisions and ultimately the
security of the United States. The United States can
not afford to make similar policy errors during current
arms control negotiations, such as regarding the
Strategic Defense Initiative.
Indeed, the principle objective of nation's arms
control policy is to promote stability and prevent a
successful attack. Today, the most common result of
arms control is not enhanced stability, but merely a
document which expresses the "ground truth" strength of
the superpowers. An example of this idea is found in
Cold Dawn; The Story of SALT where John Newhouse makes
this analysis of the SALT negotiations. He states
The talks were launched, not from a common impulse
to reduce armaments, but from a mutual need to
solemnize the parity principle -- or, put
differently, to establish an acceptance by each
side of the other's ability to inflict unacceptable
retribution in response to a nuclear attack
[Ref. lOJ.
Thus, the talks merely registered reality rather than
proceeding with trying to secure the ultimate purposes
of arms control, specifically reducing the risk of
nuclear war. A stronger quote which illustrates the
illusiveness of strategic stability in arms control
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agreements is given by William R. Graham in Arms
Control; Myth Versus Reality when he said
Arms control is at best indifferent to matters of
strategic stability. With good will and careful
planning on the part of all parties to an
agreement, arms control can increase strategic
stability. However, without such efforts, it is
also quite possible that commitments made in the
name of arms control could decrease strategic
stability. Since the question of the benefits of
arms control is still not fully resolved after two
decades of serious attempts to fulfill its
promises, it would be prudent for the United States
to consider action to enhance its control
authority in potentially unstable or otherwise
undesirable situations, without adding to
Instabl 1 i ty . . . . For arms control measures to
contribute to strategic stability, the United
States should first look to those actions that
would contribute to strategic stability even in
absence of specific arms control commitments.[Ref.ll]
In the following chapters specific questions and
perspectives that surround arms control initiatives
will be explored, revealing the strategic environment.
15
Ill . CRUISE MISSILE; A CASE STUDY
The development of the cruise missile is presented
below in a case study format. This will allow for a
coherent review of facets of arms control as they were
actually involved in the development process. These
facets include
1. A discussion of the technology that
supported the development of the cruise
missile
.
2. An analysis of the strategy and defense
doctrine utilizing the cruise missile.
3. An introduction of the variants of
cruise missiles and how the variants
were handled as an arms control issues.
4. The politics and bureaucratic
influences which were applied to the
development and deployment of the
weapon.
5. The military significance of the cruise
missile
6. A discussion of the SALT I and II
agreements as they affected the cruise
missile
.
7. A discussion of the stability and
verification Issues as revealed by a
discussion of the cruise missile.
A discussion of subsequent chapters will then expand
on these and other principles and contemporary issues
of arms control, with the Intent of making current
observations and futuristic assumptions.
The U.S. Cruise Missile programs in their
development and deployment take on a great deal more
than Just their particular Implications for arms
16
control. The study of this class of weapon systems
clearly has lessons that have impact on how current
arms control issues can and should be viewed. The
cruise missile is a classic case study representing
the full spectrum of considerations, policy decisions
and negotiations born of a technologically advanced
strategic weapon system.
A. CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
The cruise missile had it's historic beginnings in
World War II. It experienced a rebirth in the U.S. as
technological advances in the early 1970's brought the
concept of cruise missiles into modern strategic
arsenals. These technologies developed out of the
Vietnam War. The war revealed the need for remote-
piloted vehicles in the midst of growing air defense
systems and an increasingly lethal electronic
environment. [Ref. 12]
During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations the
U.S. induced NATO to adopt a flexible defense doctrine
one which would meet a conventional attack with
conventional defense measures. This, of necessity,
called for a greater NATO commitment to conventional
forces, and hopefully for the U.S., a policy that could
avoid an automatic strategic conflict between the
superpowers. [Ref. 13] Cruise missiles had desirable
technical characteristics and after winning a favorable
deployment vote by the NATO Defense Ministers the stage
was set for full development of the cruise missile.
Today, cruise missiles are found in three main
variants, the Sub Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), the
Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), and the Air
Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The systems
development occurred at the conclusions of SALT I,
where it was not a topic of discussion. Cruise
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missiles, however, were a hotly contested Issue during
SALT II and will of necessity be addressed In any
future strategic arms proposals, as there are still
numerous unresolved issues surrounding them. The
reason for the intensity of debate will be explained
later in the paper.
The systems development phase came at a time when
U.S. nuclear strategy as regards targeting was
shifting from a mutual assured destruction (MAD)
concept to a counterforce ( CF ) posture. It was clear
that cruise missiles had the power to affect this
change in nuclear strategy, as well as contribute to
United States national security. The reason for this
was that cruise missiles promised to a very affordable,
versatile, and effective weapons. The development of
cruise missiles also promised a more favorable balance
of posture between the superpowers and their strategic
arsenals. This, in theory, would lead to a more stable
environment and deterrence posture. [Ref. 14] This is
a simplistic view. Other parameters had to be taken
into account such as stability, survivability,
capability, verification, etc. The full Impact of this
statement and the targeting strategies will be
explained later. These realities, and the cruise
missiles' ability to affect the conventional, as well
as strategic defense, also supports its selection as a
basis to discuss the various aspects of arms control
parameters. Parameters that must be Juggled, weighed
and evaluated to achieve national strategic goals.
B. POLITICS / BUREAUCRACIES
Richard K. Betts, points out that military strategy
cannot be devised independent of political
considerations, for weapons influence politics and vice
versa, for they affect a large portion of society and
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thus affect many constituencies. He argues that while
procurement of weapon systems should be consistent with
military operational and strategic doctrine, the cruise
missile as a multi-purpose weapon, was dominated by
political factors in its development. [Ref. 15]
Debate has raged for years concerning the
development of cruise missiles. The controversy
(extensively developed in The Cruise Missile:
Bargaining Chip or Defense Bargain [Ref. 12]) is
whether or not cruise missiles were developed as an
arms control bargaining chip or as a defense bargain.
The term bargaining chip refers generally to two
classes of weapon systems. The first class are weapon
systems developed merely to show strength, but are
ultimately destined to be bartered away at the
bargaining table for concessions from the opponent.
The Safeguard Anti-ballistic Missile system can be
classified as such. It was a workable system but the
United States wanted to trade away a lead in Anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) systems for the signing of the
ABM treaty with the Soviets.
The other class of weapons often found in the
bargaining chip category are aging systems that would
have probably been retired unilaterally from a force's
strategic arsenal, except for their utility in making
the other side concede some point at the bargaining
table.
A defense bargain is a relative term relating to
how much security or strength a weapon system has,
based against the dollar cost of the system and its
maintenance. One contemporary arms control writer, Ron
Huisken, indicates that cruise missiles were both a
bargaining chip and a defense bargain depending on
perspectives. The initial push for cruise missiles
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came from then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, John
Foster Jr.. The former wanted to show the Soviets the
U.S. resolve to match their arms build up, while the
latter wanted a system that might frustrate Soviet SAM
defenses
.
With the possible exception of the Navy, the
military establishment did not want cruise missiles,
because they were afraid of what they would have to
give up in other programs. The Air Force, for example,
felt cruise missiles threatened the B-1 bomber project,
a concern that was later verified in the Carter
Administration. All the services were concerned about
budget impacts for a weapon system that initially had
no mission. [Ref. 16]
Other contemporary authors conclude that the
military was not only considering budget aspects in
their initial position on the cruise missile, but
suggest that the military is like any other bureaucracy
in resisting radical change. It was only political
intervention that spurred the services on from the
initial rejection of the cruise missile concept.
Within the Army, the cruise missile clearly was
perceived as a threat to the Army's taxed Vietnam War
budget. The Army launched a campaign to gather
political influence, using commitments in Vietnam as a
reason that it should not have to develop the GLCM.
The Army was successful in its fight, so the Air Force
became tasked to develop and deploy both the GLCM and
the ALCM.
The above example clearly shows that weapons that
share a limelight in the arms control arena are not
only Issues of international politics but may have
strong domestic political implications as well. Where
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these two arenas of politics collide there can be
compromises made that represent the lowest spectrum of
agreement. Often, in a democratic society these
watered down compromises, as they deal with arms
control, fail to support arms control or national
security objectives and at the same time serves no
political philosophy well.
C. BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS
The political debate often is carried by the power
of the purse, and any analysis of a strategic weapon
must consider budget factors.
Congress' ability to direct American foreign and
defense policy by the power of the purse is being used
more frequently, much to the displeasure of the
executive branch. As such the military finds that it
must not only respond to the Commander and Chief
residing in the executive branch, but now more than
ever must lobby and convince Congress of the wisdom of
programs to ensure proper funding. [Ref. 15 :p. 406]
The cruise missile from its birth seemed a cheap
affordable method of obtaining a powerful weapon in
substantial quantities. It has, however, had to prove
it's monetary merit many times on the floors of
Congress. The cruise missiles true cost, as Betts
points out, still cannot be calculated, because the
versatility of the weapon destabilized the traditional
structure of the arms control arena and its full
repercussions are as yet unknown.
Arms control has as a goal stabilizing security at
lower cost levels than if unconstrained arms
deployments continued. Betts points out that while
some weapons meet certain budget and short-term
military options, their presence can later alter the
existing status quo, leading to increased spending
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later on. Betts cites the example of multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) as a
prime example of the failure to judge interlocking
military and political opportunity costs as arms
control negotiations proceeded. He theorizes that
cruise missiles may have a similar impact. [Ref. 14:pp.
10-11] Presently, though initial projections of the
value of cruise missiles were confused, both the
military and political factions have transitioned into
an ultimately realistic concept of the system's
potential, and the cruise missile's impact on arms
control
.
Another way to project the costs of a system is
found in alternate weaponry that would have to be used
if it were not available. The easiest contrast can be
found in the example of manned aircraft having to
proceed to the target, drop its ordinance and try to
make it back, through enemy as well as friendly lines
without the stand-off-capability allowed by ALCMs
.
Loss rates are not easily identifiable but considering
pilot training costs, the "value" of a life, and the
expense of modern aircraft, cruise missiles may have
economic significance. However, the introduction of
cruise missiles may not allow for a reduction in
airframes which may be diverted to fill other tactical
roles. Cruise missiles also have to be Judged against
other missiles and rockets capable of comparable target
strikes
.
To reduce costs a great deal of effort has gone
into ensuring commonality of basic parts. Even mergers
of testing and evaluation have been mandated to cut
costs. It is noteworthy, as previously stated, that the
military services initially resisted the development of
cruise missiles. This position was generally taken as
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the services perceived a budgetary threat to programs
that were already planned and had stated missions.
Cruise missile programs were being fought even up
into the 1980s when the Navy and the Air Force fought
to drop the Medium Range Air to Surface Missile (MRASM)
development [Ref. 9:p. 2]. The MRASM was intended to
take out airports and other large scale soft targets.
The services opposition centered on budgetary as well
as operational concerns. Today, the question of how
many varieties of cruise missiles should be developed
impacts on the economy of scale that cruise missiles
promise. The budgetary concerns dealing with cruise
missiles do not end with the missile itself. It also
must Include the costs of providing a suitable launch
platform and support base. Congressional testimony held
that the cruise missile would be a true defense
bargain, as the following quote asserts:
To put it in the simplest terms, (considering) all
of the threats (to cruise missiles) we are able to
anticipate the Soviets being able to field during
the eighties, we believe we can field an effective
counter (developed internally to the cruise
missile) to that threat sooner than they can field
the threat, and dramatically cheaper .... it * s like
a four to five to one tradeoff. [Ref. 9:p. 11]
Budgeting is a factor considered in the arms
control community. All government agencies that have
dealings related to existing arms control agreements
report budget figures to the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA in turn reports to
the Bureau of Budget twice a year on all governmental
expenditures relating to arms control or strategic
activities. Thus ACDA has at Its disposal the latest




It has been stated that initially the cruise
missile program was one without a military mission. In
the this section the military significance of the
cruise missile will be discussed. One should be aware
of how with the passage of time funding, doctrine,
mission, and "necessity" may grow. Consequently, the
statement that the cruise missile was one without a
military mission might be overstated. Possibly, a
more precise statement is that the cruise missiles'
impact and mission were not fully realized initially
even by the services that would later rely on them.
The following criteria is set forth to help
determine the usefulness of a newly developed offensive
strategic system to support the triad. Ideally the new
system would have:
1. High prelaunch survivability.
2. Defense penetration capability.
3. The ability to be readily
assimilated within the present
triad structure.
4. The ability to strike targets in a manner
that would greatly affect the Soviet
defense posturing. The Soviets would then
have to utilize great resources in trying
to offset the presence of the new system.
5. The ability to close gaps in target
coverage of existing triad weapon systems.
6. The ability to easily interface with and
be supported by the strategic command,
control and communications system,
allowing for flexible response.
[Ref. 15:p. 38]
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The cruise missile offered at least marginal
productivity in all of these areas. Some areas are
worth noting. Soviet military doctrine depends upon
reducing the uncertainties of war because of the strict
control they try to exert over their committed forces.
Cruise missiles add flexibility to U.S. strategic
options and varied employment techniques, and therefore
create uncertainty for the Soviets. William H.
Kincade in an article described how the power of the
cruise missile could be multiplied by other factors.
He said:
...associated with these new weapons are broad
advances In command and control facil 1 t ies--the
central nervous system of modern warfare--that
will substantially improve weapon performance but
also expand the range of crucial and vulnerable
targets [Ref. 15:p. 315J.
The military role of the cruise missile is set in a
strategic second-strike role, primarily due to the
system's slow speed. Thus, cruise missiles, if
survivability can be guaranteed, have the attributes
needed to be an important part of the strategic reserve
forces. Concerning survivability. Sorrels quotes
congressional testimony which attests to the
survivability of the cruise missile in the following
excerpt
:
Generally, the results from the flight tests
support past assessments of cruise missile
survivability. The cruise is difficult to detect
and track, both by radars and infrared sensors, as
well as optical and acoustical means.
[Ref. 9:p. 11]
Deployed on bombers, the ALCM adds to the
penetration of Soviet air defenses. Cruise missile
accuracies conform to targeting options required of
counterforce targeting. The addition of cruise
missiles to the U.S. naval arsenal has added range and
offensive power to in-service vessels [Ref. 17].
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Cruise missiles at sea were greatly strengthened by
convictions that they could serve as a strategic
reserve force.
It must also be understood that cruise missiles
were in development when mutual assured destruction
(MAD) was the basis of U.S. nuclear policy. MAD
requires the ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear
strike capable of inflicting unacceptable damage to
Soviet Union's economy and population. This later
officially transitioned into the counterforce targeting
doctrine. The counterforce strategy requires a
flexible range of appropriate responses to external
threats, ultimately requiring a nuclear retaliatory
strike capability centered in a counterforce targeting
concept. The targeting once again ensures unacceptable
damage in that the enemy is prevented from effectively
carrying out his ultimate military designs. Arms
control as viewed from SALT I and SALT II agreements do
not support or reflect the new counterforce strategic
targeting doctrine developed between these two periods.
The cruise missile therefore can not Just be evaluated
in terms of arms control agreements, (SALT I & SALT II)
but must also be considered in regards to how it
supports national security. This is especially true
as our national security posture changed between SALT I
and SALT II.
The important concept to grasp is that while United
States strategic doctrine was officially changing from
mutually assured destruction to a counterforce
doctrine, arms control agreements were being concluded
based on a MAD concept. A Congressional Budget Office
report commented that the superceded doctrinal concept
of MAD had transitioned to a point where
The United States is currently engaged in
substantial expansion and modernization of the
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nation's strategic nuclear forces. Those effortshave been accompanied by a revolution of militarydoctrine that would govern use of nuclear weapons
in the event of attack. That evolving new doctrineimplies that Soviet aggression can no longer bedeterred by a U.S. arsenal that is only capable ofprompt and large-scale retaliation, but must also
be prepared to sustain^ nuclear combat of various
scales and durations. [Ref. 18]
The following classical quote from Newhouse's book,
Cold Dawn; The Story of SALT, clearly shows that SALT
was based on MAD.
partly
up with _the United States in
in the talks becauseThe Russians ... are
they have caught ^ _..
strategic weapons. Their efforts, after the Cuban
.nissile trauma, to match the Americans by achieving
a balanced second-strike force have succeeded. Now,
the Soviet leaders, like America's, hope to head
off another major offensive weapons cycle. They
know that to succeed they must inhibit ballistic-
missile defense, an insight acquired from the
Americans. Baldly, this means that defending
people is the most troublesome of all strategic
options, for stability demands that each of the
two societies stand wholly exposed to the
destructive power of the other. [Ref. 10:p. 3]
An oversimplified table of the requirements of MAD
and the results of the SALT I and SALT II negotiations
demonstrates how these agreements followed through in a
MAD mind set instead of the CF strategy the military
was tasked to employ.
Requirements of Assured
Destruction
1. No area population
defense allowed







3. Large number of warheads

















weapons should be restricted
SALT I & II
Provisions
The language of
SALT I & II places








6. Finite amount of throw 6. Greatly discussed
weight desired as to meet no agreement made
destruction needs without
allowing for "overkill". [Ref.l9]
It seems that arms control negotiations stayed with
the MAD concept because it was a cheaper economic
strategy, it was easier, and took fewer missiles to
hold the USSR populace hostage then to try target and
destroy military targets, although the strategic
policy of the United States was shifted toward
counterforce targeting. Indeed some of the
requirements of counterforce targeting are accuracy,
more flexible targetable systems, which respond to an
improved command, control, and communication system
[Ref. 20]. A review of SALT efforts finds these topics
relatively undiscussed in substance. The Soviets may
have been more aware of the United States' own doctrine
as it sought in the protocol associated with SALT II,
to greatly restrict cruise missiles a system capable of
great accuracy, flexibility and able to be retargeted
quickly.
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Some writers have argued that cruise missiles did
support MAD but Betts, in his exhaustive work, argues
that cruise missiles in fact did not contribute to
MAD. Betts concludes that the triad was not
significantly threatened to not be reliable in
delivering a retaliatory assured destruction strike.
It is true that the development of ALCMs which were not
merely replacements for other existing weapons, though
they helped compensate for what was feared to be a
decreasing ability of the U.S. bomber force to
penetrate to their targets. [Ref. 14:p. 12]
Consequently cruise missile capabilities were not
required to support MAD. There were other weapons that
already served those purposes. The cruise missiles
were desired to augment and fill in strategic
targeting voids required by a Counterforce doctrine.
Little in the arms control negotiations of that era
reflected the requirements of a counterforce strategic
posture. MAD was still the basis used to negotiate in
the SALT talks and evaluate weapons systems such as the
cruise missile. This, at a time when the Defense
Department was called upon to ensure counterforce
targeting and was making use of cruise missile
technology to meet this targeting mission and other
requirements, dictated by Presidential Directive 59.
This directive stressed a traditional war-fighting
approach to the design of strategic nuclear forces.
This required, as a matter of policy, sufficient forces
and plans that would lead to the convincing of the
Soviets that in an outbreak of nuclear war they could
never obtain victory. [Ref. 21]
The system's accuracy, hard target kill capacity,
targetable range, plus its fire and forget mode made
the system an ideal counterforce weapon. The cruise
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missile's utility seemed limited only to the extent
that command and control facilities and delivery
platforms could not be guaranteed to be intact after
absorbing a first strike.
There was some concern for whether or not the U.S.
bomber force could achieve airborne status in a Soviet
first strike. If survivable, cruise missiles had great
potential for increasing the number of warheads needed
to achieve desired results on Soviet targets.
Counterforce weapons have a common characteristic if
not a requirement of fast flight times. In the case of
cruise missiles its long flight time was viewed as a
uniquely beneficial characteristic. Secretary of
Defense Brown stated:
I am certain that the cruise missile will improve
the world's perception of the potency of our
forces, not only by maintaining strategic force
parity with the Soviets Union, but also by
retaining a clear technological superiority.
And... we are doing all this with a weapon that
because of its long^flight time, does not threaten
a first capability. [RefT 22]
Cruise missiles substantially increased the number of
warheads available for targeting and promised ranges
that would ensure delivery to designated targets. This
became especially important as strategists looked for a
weapon to deliver a hard-target kill capability. The
weapon capability of penetration is dramatically
increased as they are targeted in sufficient numbers to
overwhelm air defense targeting and detection
capabilities
.
Cruise missiles promised that the mid-1970s Nixon
Administration doctrine of strategic sufficiency could
be met in a concept of essential equivalence by use of
cruise missiles to offset Soviet strength in other
weapon systems. [Ref. 12:p. 20]. The missile systems
became increasingly important when Secretary of Defense
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Schlesinger signaled a strategic change In concept and
targeting In January of 1975. Schlesinger was quoted as
follows
:
To a large extent the American doctrinal position
has been wrapped around something called assureddestruction which implies a tendency to target
Soviet cities initially and massively and that
this is the principal option that a President would
have. It is our intention that this not be the
only option and possibly not the principal option.[Ref. 12:p. 20] ^ ^ p p p
These systems promised to prolong existing heavy
bomber capabilities of the B-52 until a new generation
of bombers would be approved for deployment.
Consequently, the cruise missile, in an era where MAD
was still being discussed at the conference table,
filled the counterforce role for the military as
current national security doctrine called for. A large
part of this proper strategic development came out of
the physical and technical aspects of the cruise
missile
.
This era started a long and lasting debate on
whether or not United States national security policy
and its arms control policies are consistent and
mutually beneficial. In the case of the cruise missile
they were not. Militarily the cruise missile promised
to greatly enhance national security needs. Arms
control initiatives as will be shown later in this case
study limited their full potential.
E. TECHNOLOGY
The cruise missile has been cursed as being an
illusive entity to describe and control at the
bargaining table. Roger P. Labrie argues that not all
technology developments need threaten arms control.
Technology that makes strategic arms less vulnerable
can be good. Technologies that helps verification and
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technology that reduces the risk of accidents are also
desirable. [Ref. 23]
A cruise missile is by definition an unmanned, air-
breathing expendable vehicle programmed to deliver an
explosive charge [Ref. 14:pp. 3-5]. The normal
trajectory is very low and, initially sub-sonic.
Presently, there are attempts to increase it's speed
and range. As stated earlier, the cruise missile
technology is really a composite of various
technologies that had matured early in the 1970s which
made the cruise missile viable. The U.S. laid to rest
an earlier cruise missile program in the 1950s after
dismal operational results. The technologies available
in this new initiative were: small turbofan engines now
being replaced by ramjets or hybrid models of both
technologies, small high-yield warheads, advanced
navigational and mapping aids, and airframe
developments
.
These promised to deliver a powerful weapon at an
affordable price. Cruise missiles have enormous
versatility in their deployment, range and the
payloads. Cruise missiles can be launched from
virtually any launch platform. The cruise missile has
impressive range capabilities and can carry a
conventional or nuclear payload. The low and zig-zag
trajectory promised to frustrate detection and negate
portions of the Soviets advanced air defenses.
Initial proponents for the cruise missile had
tactical and strategic rationales in mind, though it
took some time for these ideas to be transformed into
operational doctrine [Ref. 14:p. 8]. This case
existed, because initially the cruise missile was
pushed by civilian proponents over concerns expressed
by the military establishment. Thus the opportunities
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cruise missiles presented to the military establishment
were not immediately exploited as discussed in Section
D: Military Significance. The technology of the cruise
missile was later developed to meet U.S. strategic
interests. Thus the cruise missile was a weapon system
developed in an operational vacuum, as it initially
advanced without a concrete use or purpose. While this
is not unheard of in weapon procurement, it reveals why
the cruise missile had a progressively larger role in
arms control negotiations, as both the U.S. military
and the Soviets realized it's real weapon potential.
It is not so much that the cruise missile is so
technically advanced but that it has a tremendous
potential to be cheaply "product improved" to meet new
threats. The cruise missile has a built In capacity to
respond to threat changes with faster innovation and
response times than most systems because of its
simplicity of design. Consequently, cruise missiles
pose a potent and adaptable weapon capable of meeting
armament needs, even with possible use on the "stealth"
bomber
.
The discussion above shows that national security
is not merely a political question nor a technical
issue alone. The cruise missile was born out of
technology, given life by the political process, and
adapted by the military. Thus, technology creates the
"necessary", not the "sufficient" condition to deploy.
The lesson to derive is an appreciation that
feasible weapon technology must gain political support,
evidenced in funding and then be able to fill a
doctrinal role in the military before deployment can be
anticipated. Any shortfall in any of these areas may
cause the demise of the weapon program. This
integration of factors should be at the forefront of
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any discussion of new strategic programs being
discussed, such as SDI . Once a system is deployed the
ultimate test is whether or not the stability of
deterrence is enhanced or significant military
advantage has been gained.
F. STABILITY
Strategic instability is more a function of one's
vulnerability than the accuracy of one's missiles. Thus
as U.S. interests concluded that the procurement and
deployment of cruise missiles decreased U.S.
vulnerability consequently, strategic stability seemed
assured. In fact, arms control and deterrent strategy,
if acting in harmony, are based on the same factor,
that of stability. [Ref. 8:p. 3]
Weapons and agreements which correct growing
vulnerabilities in our strategic forces, provide
invulnerability for our strategic reserve, and reduce
conflict escalation, and improve the offensive
capability of the United States general purpose forces,
assure a greater degree of stability in relationship to
the Soviets.
Stability in the international arena really has two
components. There is crisis stability and long term
arms race stability. Crisis stability can be defined
as the situation where neither superpower has
incentive to launch a preemptive first-strike. This
incentive rests in terms of perceived weakness of its
own forces or concerns that a retaliatory strike of
unacceptable damage would be inflicted by the attacked
foe. Long term stability can be found in the perception
that neither superpower feels the necessity to
undertake further arms development in order to not be
found at a nuclear disadvantage in relation to the
other superpower.
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At the time of the cruise missile development the
U.S. perceived that the Soviets had quantitative leads
in many areas of strategic Importance, most noticeably
in ICBMs. The U.S. also felt that U.S. ICBMs were
increasingly vulnerable to technological advances, that
made Soviet targeting much more accurate. Cruise
missiles made for a more stable environment in the
survivability and capability of the triad based on the
systems targeting and accuracy traits.
The cruise missile, however, introduced some
destabilizing influences in the arms control arena by
the problems it created in weapon system verification.
Cruise missiles allowed for various targeting postures,
and also allowed for escalation control and for a more
tailored and flexible response than most weapon
systems. Complicating this flexibility is that the
cruise missile can have either a conventional or
nuclear payload. Soviets observing incoming cruise
missiles are now faced with the dilemma of how to
determine whether they are faced with a conventional or
a nuclear attack. [Ref. 9
: pp . 148-154] The drawback
to the cruise missile was most apparent in it's
verification aspect. This had always been an arms
control concern for the U.S., but was dropped, if for
no other reason, than cruise missiles gave the U.S. a
quick strategic fix to a perceived strategic imbalance
between superpowers. Huisken offers another rational.
He says the U.S. had recognized from the outset, and
was actually prompted to develop cruise missiles, since
the Soviets had cruise missiles with strategic
potential. This was done over the objections of some
that thought there would be considerable verification
problems that could never be covered by or be
accountable to SALT type agreements.
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[Ref. 13:pp. 48-50] The aspect of verification will be
fully developed In the next section.
G. VERIFICATION
One of the biggest arms control headaches occurred
around the verification of cruise missiles as mentioned
above. Verification of cruise missile agreements was
extremely difficult as national technical means were
not sufficient in all cases to achieve a high degree of
verification. The variety of platforms, and the fact
that a cruise missile may be a conventional or nuclear
weapon with no outside revealing features presents a
complicated problem indeed. Not only has payload been
an issue, but verifying ranges poses similar. There
exists a potential tradeoff of payload, which allows
speeds that can enhance the first-strike capability of
the cruise missile. [Ref. 12:p. ix] Such speeds would
allow targeting cruise missiles with their great
accuracy against Soviet ICBM fields denying any reload
capacity, and possibly some initial launches of Soviet
ICBMs. Testing for cruise missiles can largely be done
in a lab environment or through analysis of tests
designed not to reveal the true parameters, performance
or other characteristic of the missile to hostile
elements. Since external inspection, noting the launch
platform, and monitoring test flight constituted the
core on national technical means it was the U.S. view




accountability in SALT (this view) was not shared
by the Soviet Union. The latter country's
unswerving determination to have U.S. cruise
missiles constrained by SALT led to the
undermining of the main organizing principle on
which the negotiations had been based, namely, the
ability to identify a class of weapons in terms of
its (strategic) function. [Ref. 22:p. 190]
Cruise missiles, by virtue of their small cross
section, posed special tracking problems. Just how all
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these issues were handled in SALT I and II will be
shown in a discussion of the talks.
H. THE SALT ENVIRONMENT
A common criticism of SALT I is that it was
supposed to halt the growth of Soviet strategic forces,
especially ICBMs. SALT I however did not and now
Soviet ICBMs greatly threaten the United States' ICBMs
[Ref. 24]. Indeed, in 1969 the United States sought to
constrain the USSR's build up through SALT
unfortunately, this attempt failed because the
flawed nature of those agreements permitted huge
Soviet increases. The Soviets continued building
up with arms control agreements that actually
legitimized the buildup of Soviet capabilities.[Ref. 6:p. 62] ^
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
gave figures showing this increase when they concluded
The Soviet Union had continued its development and
deployment of heavy ballistic missiles and had
overtaken the U.S. lead in land-based ICBMs.
During the SALT 1 years alone its ICBMs rose from
around 1,000 to around 1,500. and they were being
deployed^at the rate of some 200 annually
[Ref. 25].
The original goals of arms control were conceived:
to reduce the threat of war , reduce the cost of
preparing for war, and reduce the damage should war
occur. These original goals of arms control are noble
in nature though the supporting positions and premises
which the classical approach sought to use to obtain




Arms control should be a process of
technical discussions.
2. Superpowers have common interests.
3. Belief In the "spill-over effect". (If
the United States got arms control
agreements, it could help in other
areas )
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4. Arms control agreements would
necessarily enhance stability.
[Ref. 1]
It is important to review each of these premises
for problems other than the obvious one, that given the
premises of classical thought arms control became an
end in itself. Robin Ranger in Arms and Politics 1958-
1978: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context
,
points out that the United States' arms control
policies were apolitical, stressing technical
solutions. The United States' technical arms control
policies were based largely in scientific emphasis due
to a belief that deterrence depended on military
technology, and that verification could only be assured
through technology. Technical issues also could be
easily defended as logical and factors of fairness
could be extracted in the equation type approach
offered across the negotiation table. The Soviets have
always taken a different approach.
...by 1963, the Soviet Union's adaptation of the
concept of arms control to meet its political
objectives had produced an implicit theory of
political arms control. Soviet actions and
statements, shorn of their propaganda, were
consistent with the view that the political causes,
not the technical symptoms, of strategic instability
had to be dealt with through nominal
arms-control measures. [Ref. 26]
The USSR's arms control policies are an extension of
its political maneuvering. Ranger concludes his
contrasting of the US' and the USSR's as follows:
Western theories of technical arms control have
failed to be translated into policy where as the
Soviet Union has secured measures of political arms
control [Ref. 26:p. viij.
Ranger continues by noting that arms control agreements
to date are at very best minimal, non-restrictive, and
that history shows only political arms control is
likely to prove negotiable. The reader is encouraged
to thoroughly read Ranger's above mentioned work. The
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book is exhaustive in his analysis of intellectual,
historical, and public-policy records as he reviews all
the major arms control agreements from mid-1950s to
SALT II to develop and support his conclusions.
The Soviets in their arms control dealings not only
acted In a political manner with regards to the US, but
actually used american politics to fulfill their aims.
The Soviets counted on exploiting America's faith
in the arms control process, and our deep desire to
reduce the risk of war, to inhibit a US response to
the shift in the balance of power. The Soviets
were able to use our domestic politics and public
opinion to ^cloud compliance issues for years.[Ref. 6:p.62]
The second premise of arms control was based on
mirror imaging. To cast the mold of the Soviet
intentions and desires to be like the United States was
far too simple. Political processes, national goals
all differ and to think that the threat of nuclear war
would cause both nations to have a similar perspective
was a grave error. Mirror imaging was only one of a
variety of U.S. perspective problems. Newhouse shows
how disorganized the United States embarked into SALT
negotiations by stating:
Little of the preparation for SALT had much
reference to Moscow's attitudes; Washington didn't
know what these were. The concern was. not what
might be negotiable with Moscow, but what could be
negotiated with the Pentagon. [Ref. 10:p. 125]
With such a lack of preparation and unity it is easy to
see why negotiators have often fallen Into the trap of
mirror imaging. The reader is referred to the upcoming
section on verification and compliance for a greater
understanding of this Issue.
The history of arms control has shown that there is
little positive "spill-over effect" into other areas as
the superpowers had negotiated arms control
agreements. In fact, the term "linkage" has often
shown that arms control efforts can only be successful
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when there are strong leaders and general goodwill
between the superpowers. Linkage of arms control
issues have been used by both nations to achieve policy
changes in the opposite government.
The last aspect of arms control dealt with
stability. Here the classical approach greatly
oversold SALT. SALT did not prevent the arms build up
nor change USSR's political goals, nor did it stabilize
the strategic balance. The fact of the matter is that
the United States needed to realize "the bankruptcy of
(its) arms-control theory and the policy of seeking
strategic stability almost exclusively through SALT".
[Ref. 26:p. 217] This realization occurred to some as
the they exposed SALT I as a failure and to more after
opposition developed against SALT II. The Reagan
Administration came to office with similar views and
proposed the beginning of the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START). This realization came about amid
comments such as the following:
...there is every prospect that under the terms of
the SALT agreements the Soviet Union will continue
to pursue a nuclear superiority that is not merely
quantitative but designed to produce a theoretical
war-winning capability [Ref. 27 J
.
Such was the general environment even when the
cruise missile first came on stage.
New strategic weapons programs usually are debated
extensively to determine the force size requirement and
other technical details. This did not happen with the
cruise missile, which really came on the scene a month
after the signing of SALT I. With the signing of SALT
I in 1972 the U.S. formally acknowledged it had lost
strategic superiority over the Soviets.
The U.S. had tried to get Soviet sea-launched
cruise missiles on the SALT I agenda but Soviets did
not want to talk. This refusal contributed to the U.S.
initially developing a cruise missile. [Ref. 13:p. 4]
The next time cruise missiles were discussed was in




Technology has always been the main stay for
both the U.S.' conventional and strategic strength. The
aim being to achieve technical superiority to offset
numerical and other asymmetries. The initial interest,
as stated above, in relooklng at cruise missile
technology was conceived out of a fear of existing
Soviet sea-launched cruise missiles [Ref. 13:pp. 4-9].
The U.S. took cruise missile development from a
position of Inferiority to a position of prominence
within the span of a few years. This reactive mode
between the U.S. and the Soviets has typified the arms
control processes. It was only when the U.S. achieved
a technological prominence that the Soviets clamored
for restrictions in the SALT II discussions. This was
not only for the strategic effect the Soviets saw in
cruise missiles, but also for the conventional role
that cruise missiles could achieve in the NATO
al 1 lance
.
An evaluation of the evidence set forth by
Huisken would suggest that the Soviets believed well
into 1974 that the strategic U.S. cruise missile
program was a hollow bargaining chip. It was only after
substantive developments later in 1974 that the Soviets
changed their bargaining positions as reflected in the
November, 1974 Vladivostok talks. By then it was quite
clear that the Soviets appreciated the true threat that
cruise missiles represented. In these talks and the
subsequent January 1975 SALT talks, cruise missiles and
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backfire bombers were linked together to proceed with
negotiations. This linkage continued into 1976 when
the Soviets submitted a new bargaining position,
Including efforts to limit cruise missiles. [Ref.
13:pp. 22-29] The United States, did not agree with
the proposal directly limiting cruise missiles, and
thus the U.S. advanced its own position. This position
sought to link Soviet ICBM throw-weight limits to any
acceptance of cruise missile restrictions. This was
possible because the U.S. and the Soviets now
understood the developing strategic role cruise
missiles were to take in the strategic establishment.
The presidential election saw President Carter come to
office and in May of 1977, shortly after that a
tentative sketch of the SALT II agreement was struck.
In essence this is what it contained as it applied to
cruise missiles:
a. A treaty lasting through 31 December
1985 based on the Vladivostok
ceilings
.
b. A protocol which, for a period of three
years, would provide for some
constraints on the more contentious
issues, that is, cruise missiles, the
Backfire, mobile ICBMs and ICBM throw-
weight .
c. A statement of principles to guide the
negotiation of SALT III. [Ref. 3:p. 32]
This tentative agreement however lapsed in dispute at
the bargaining table. Notably, the SALT I treaty also
lapsed (3 Oct 1977). These two events left a very
unfavorable arms control negotiating atmosphere. The
failure of the tentative agreement centered about
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the cruise missile and peripheral issues such as Iran,
Afghanistan and full recognition of China.
Concurrently, the cruise missile issue was in
the domestic lime light, as the debate concerning the
B-1 bomber and various alternatives were being
explored. (B-52s in an ALCM configuration). The JCS
argued that both systems were needed and that a range
of 3,750 km was needed for the ALCM to effectively
reach proposed Soviet targets. This demand seemed all
the more necessary as the B-1 project was later shelved
by President Carter.
Arms control negotiations finally resumed and
in May of 1979 the SALT II Treaty was signed. SALT II
included the following provisions concerning cruise
missiles:
a. Any aircraft armed with long-range
cruise missiles (range in excess of
600km) would count as one MIRVed
strategic delivery vehicle.
b. Existing heavy bombers can carry up to
20 long range cruise missiles and the
number on existing and future types
cannot exceed an average of 28.
c. Up to 120 aircraft armed with long-
range cruise missiles can be deployed
without cost in terms of displaced
MIRVed missiles. Deployments in excess
of 120 are permitted but only at the
expense of an equal number of MIRVed
ballistic missiles.
d. If an aircraft type is deployed as a
cruise missile carrier and in other
roles, the former variant will be given
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externally observable differences to
permit verification.
e. Multiple-warhead cruise missiles are
banned In the protocol (which expired
on 31 December 1981):
f. Ground- and sea-launched cruise
missiles, if deployed, will be limited
to a maximum range of 600 km although
prototypes can be tested to any range.
2. CRUISE MISSILE; SALT II Analysis
The real effect of cruise missiles on the arms
control process can best be assessed In what It brought
new to the bargaining table. First, It brought an
emerging technology with future looking applications,
that were not always quantlfable. Second, It brought
to the negotiation table a weapon system of
conventional and strategic significance, where only the
strategic had been considered In the past. Thirdly, It
brought Inherent verification headaches. Lastly, the
cruise missile In Its dual capacity, brought to the
forefront that the United States had to not only
consider itself but show consideration in its arms
control positions for its allies.
SALT II was sharply criticized by the Armed
Services Committee. The Committee went on record
discussing the military implications of the proposed
SALT II Treaty. The committee said "as it now stands,
it (SALT II) is not in the national security Interests
of the United States of America". [Ref. 24:p. 1]
They concluded that SALT II was unequal in
favor of the Soviet Union and therefore inconsistent
with Public Law 92-448 (also known as the Jackson
Amendment which ordered SALT II negotiators to come up
with arms control agreements in a formula having equal
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numeric limits on weapons) and that it would allow the
USSR to gain general military superiority in the mid
1980's. Specifically, the committee listed the
following facts:
a. The treaty formalized inequalities in
ICBM throw weight between the two
nations
.
b. The USSR was the sole nation with heavy
ICBMs.
c. The treaty failed to include and
restrict the backfire bombers and the
SS-20 missiles.
d. The treaty lacked adequate means of
verification
.
e. The treaty contained the bad precedent
of the protocol on cruise missiles.
f. The treaty left loop holes in testing
and deploying of ICBMs. The so called
5th generation ICBMs could be built
under the treaty.
g. Warhead constraints were insignificant
and were to be lifted in 1985 (ICBMs).
All these flaws were apparent even after the lessons of
SALT I had been assimilated. The Jackson Amendment
(PL92-448) which came as a result of SALT I did not
allow for differences in the force structuring of the
US and the USSR's strategic forces. It required
equality in weapons systems. This was done to avoid a
lasting handicap on the United States in future arms
control negotiations. The amendment also sought to
ensure that U.S. and Soviet strategic forces appeared
equal in the eyes of the world and their allies. The
SALT II agreement had seemly circumvented the entire
emphasis of the Jackson Amendment.
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other broader conclusions and generalizations
came out of the SALT II era. The concerns that the
United States had going into SALT II remained as
indicated in the following quote.
SALT agreements have not solved and cannot solve
particular military problems, such as the
vulnerability of the US land-based missile force.
In general, it is argued that arms control became
divorced from defense planning. Negotiations were
pursued for the sake of reaching agreements
irrespective of their relationship to force posture
or foreign policy considerations. And, as a
consequence of the high-level political support
accorded the SALT process, national force posture
decisions that would otherwise have been a natural
outcome of defense planning were distorted, delayed
or nullified. What is needed to remedy this
situation, it is now claimed, is to downplay the
significance of arms control negotiations, reduce
their scope, lower our expectations about what can
be achieved through such agreements, and
"integrate" ^arms control into defense planning.
[Ref. 2:p. 1]
The Armed Services Committee worried that SALT II would
give the Soviets the ability to destroy all US ICBMs
and that the President of the United States would have
to deal with the USSR at a profound political
disadvantage. It was noted that the Soviet buildup
had to be answered in US defense spending and not an
undue reliance on negotiations, unwarranted notions
about Soviet cooperation, or the unfounded assumption
that SALT treaties reflect Soviet restraint and
forbearance, and concluded that overly optimistic hopes
that the Soviets threat to our security were being
lessened were inconsistent with the facts.
[Ref. 24:p. 3]
The failure of the SALT process was not only a
result of the SALT arms control approach. Other
aspects can be found that played a significant part.
This is especially true when one considers the split
between arms control and defense planning. It is
argued that formidable domestic political and
organizational constraints limited the feasibility for
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integrating arms control and defense planning. These
constraints included:
a. fragmentation of authority;
b. overburdened senior officials,
c. irreconcilable ideologies of national
leaders
,
d. conflicting organizational stakes, and
e. the "clean slate" phenomenon as each
new administration comes to power.
Some contemporary thinkers believe that it is
highly doubtful given the formidable obstacles
identified above, that defense planning and arms
control will ever become mutually sensitized to the
point that either:
a. Weapons are only deployed that satisfy
arms control definitions of stability
and desirability.
b. Arms control agreements are only
reached that meet defense community
standards of security. [Ref. 2:p. 20]
Charles Sorrels, in his book U.S. Crui se
Missile Programs : Development, Deployment and
Implications for Arms Control
,
points out that SALT II
severely restricted US national strategy. He cited
several examples, including the Air Force, which did
not study a theater ALCM option out of concern that
aircraft carrying these weapons might be classified as
heavy bombers. SALT II also seemed to depart from the
significant position the U.S. had always maintained of
not including U.S. forward based systems in arms
control discussions. Furthermore, Admiral Hollaway
III, Chief of Naval Operations, testified in Feb 1976
that cruise missile range restrictions established in
the protocol were not equitable as the U.S. had a
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distinct disadvantage because of the coastal
positioning of U.S. cities and industrial areas. The
SALT provision which imposed a cost when a total of 120
ALCM aircraft were reached truly restricted only the
U.S. who had plans to deploy such systems. SALT II
limited other options that might have led to other
cruise missile carriers other than B-52, such as
modified 747s or C-5s. All these plans became captives
of an arms control agreement that is fairly
characterized as a bad agreement one that not only
covered strategic cruise missiles but limited in
practice conventionally armed cruise missiles as well.
[Ref. 9:pp. 162-164]
The SALT process clearly showed that strategic
forums and discussions are required to handle a variety
of issues simultaneously issues that can bleed over
from the strategic, to the theater (INF/LRTNF), to
conventional issues centered about NATO defense. This
is largely why the Reagan Administration has gone with
a negotiation strategy of carrying various talks on
separate topics concurrently under the direction of
separate arms control negotiation teams.
J. SALT CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has discussed the various parameters
that surrounded the deployment of the cruise missile.
Parameters that are relevant to any new strategic
system. Linkage and actual bargaining practices have
only slightly been touched upon for the sake of
simplicity and clarity. Consequently these
conclusions, though well documented, may not have been
fully developed in the narrative, but to avoid listing
them would serve to leave out the morale or essence of
the lesson a case study of the cruise missile can
bring.
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First consider the Soviets. Ron Huisken in his
book, makes a strong argument that the Soviets have a
highly centralized and cohesive military influence in
their arms control policy, there being no civilian
officials in the defensive departments with authority
over the professional soldier. He argues that the
Soviets see limiting of nuclear arms as a military, not
an arms control or disarmament issue per se. They see
everything in terms of their defensive posture to
protect mother Russia. [Ref. 10:p. 9]
Weiss concludes something similar when he says
The Soviet interest is in optimizing its position.
It looks upon arms control negotiations as only one
of several tools available to it to demonstrate
the ultimate righteousness of its vision of the
world - a world in which Communist states led by
the Soviet Union are preeminent [Ref. 28].
The warning must be that with the Soviets pursuing
political and military objectives in arms control
agreements, the United States has to continue a dual
track concept, one of negotiation, as well as one of
weapon development and enhancement [Ref. 8:p. 18].
The success of the Soviets at the bargaining table
points to ways the United States may choose to change
the way it conducts arms control negotiations. The
United States needs to restore the harmony between arms
control and the military's mission of providing for
strategic defense. This would require the military
having a larger role in developing and negotiating arms
control policy. This is not to suggest that civilian
control of arms control talks should be aggregated
solely to the military. It does however speak for a
larger role of the military in negotiation teams.
The United States' failure to present a political
agenda instead of a technical agenda should be
modified as well. The overall policy that the U.S.
proposes should be agreed upon with due consideration
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of the military's concerns. These changes would allow
for more constancy in purpose, consistency in strategic
military doctrine and smoother evolutionary transition
into future strategic defense doctrine as well as arms
control positions. It would also place arms control in
a position of support of U.S. strategic defense as
initially envisioned by classical arms control theory.
Secondly, consider how U.S. arms control
perspectives need to be changed. The U.S. must realize
that complicating any agreement is that U.S. and Soviet
Interests are not mirror images and as such, that
asymmetries make reaching agreements very hard. It must
also be considered that because of the U.S. nuclear
guarantee for the allies, there is less flexibility in
the negotiation strategies available to the United
States. For NATO a large part of their security relies
not only in US strength but in their belief that the
U.S. will honor her pledges and not trade away things
of value to her allies. Weiss captured the total
picture of SALT II to the United States' allies when he
said: "The SALT II agreement provided the strongest
impetus to Gaullism in the last 20 years"
[Ref. 28:p. 64].
Thirdly, consider the nature of negotiations
between the superpowers. Huisken concluded that cruise
missiles have proved the artificiality of distinction
between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.
Likewise in the future SDI might prove there is no
distinction between earth and space, that space is a
medium for defense or offense just as the air, land or
sea. Consequently, SALT had to widen it's mandate and
the U.S. needed to broaden it's strategic negotiating
policies. President Reagan did this in START proposals
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and by eventually getting three standing committees
going. Huisken also concluded that:
The prolonged negotiations and the meager resultshave significantly undermined the credibility of
the thesis that arms control agreements are apreferable and viable alternative to unilateral
armament as a way of preserving a strategic balance[Ref. 13:pp. 57-58].
Weiss notes the consistent pattern of negotiation
the Soviets have of opposing U.S. strategic initiatives
and developmental programs. He points out that the
U.S. has often given in to Soviet pressure even in
disregard of the laborious interagency technical
studies indicating such positions could hurt U.S.
national security. These unwise positions were
embraced in an effort to support the process of arms
control. The cruise missile case study gives many
examples of this. One small example is where the
protocol, which limited the deployment of GLCMs , did
not allow us to shift quick readiness alert ( QRA ) roles
for 600+ aircraft. These aircraft were desperately
needed to fill tactical missions in NATO's force
structure. [Ref. 28:p. 63]
Lastly, consider what all this means for arms
control. Ironically, in search of parity, or symmetry,
arms control negotiations can stimulate the arms race
and drive deployments up. It can encourage developing
weapon systems and keeping old ones alive to use as
bargaining chips. History has shown it is not arms
races that the world must fear, but that war comes out
of weakness and irresolution by one or both of the
antagonists
.
Arms control also shows that formal negotiations
tend to produce greater clarity and legal nuances that
at times can prove to be undesirable. There are times
when some things should be left gray, especially when
they support survivability.
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In sum, the Inherent deficiency of the SALT II
Treaty is its inability to achieve the most
J j.__^ _^j_--^4„_ _x. arms control: strategictyimportant oblective of i
stability [Rei*. 17:p. xi].
One could conclude if stability is paramount to
peace and deterrence, that there should first be a
consensus on how to measure it. It seems that is very
hard to access and agree upon, thus the reason for
negotiations, and the process continues.
The failure of SALT might be said to prove that
agreements can only be modest in what they get and that
unilaterally the United States must provide for its
national security.
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IV. STRATEGIC EMPHASIS AREAS
The author should have now convinced the reader
that there Is evidence that arms control Initiatives in
the past have diverged from the evolution of U.S.
strategic policy. This trend was most apparent during
the SALT era and Is now being reversed by the Reagan
Administration. The military has a legitimate Interest
in influencing arms control initiatives. This Influence
must first be born out of an understanding of what arms
control is and what it has become by seizing the
opportunities found in the R&D process, funding and
fielding strategic systems that are consistent with
national security goals and doctrine. The author has
spent little time pointing out exactly what the
military should do to achieve these goals. This is
because the actions available to the military are
implicit in the Issues that arms control deals with.
The key facet is to keep national security Interests in
the forefront of arms control. Arms control agreements
should only be secured that are consistent with those
security interests.
Now that a general overview of national security
and arms policy has been given and followed by an
illustrative case study form the past, there remains
two other requirements for this paper. The first is to
provide the reader a glimpse of the present and future
issues at the forefront of national strategic security
Interests, which should of necessity be considered in
arms control initiatives. The second is to revisit
certain emphasis areas that are far more Important than
the case study of cruise missiles could facilitate in
discussion
.
Returning to the first topic needing comment, there
exists numerous avenues one could take. The author
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could discuss the present and future by discussing the
current strategic weapon systems coming Into or
proposed for the United States strategic arsenal.
Another area of discussion could center on what some
consider the United States* ultimate crisis "the
vulnerability of the US ICBM force". One could review
the current positions and emphasis areas now being
handled by arms control negotiators.
All these approaches seem flawed by the author for
three reasons. The approach to consider current
negotiations is void if one accepts that arms control
initiatives need to be revised before they will be in a
position to be most supportive of and secure national
security. To discuss current problems of the U.S.
strategic forces centers the discussion in past
mistakes. Discussing specific weapons systems becomes
a discussion of technical trivia. It then makes more
sense to consider the primary emphasis that the defense
department is working on, which they feel is necessary
to secure the national defense. This will be done in
the following section centering on, not a weapon
system, but on a systems analysis on the strategic
command, control and communications (C-cubed) of the
United States.
The other approaches share an additional flaw as
they are overshadowed by the concept of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI), all except the work being
pursued in the C-cubed area. SDI could easily prove
the only feasible answer to safeguard the
vulnerability of the United States ICBM force. It also
overshadows the strategic offensive weapons that maybe
under development. It does this by providing for a new
strategic doctrine one based on a more balanced
reliance on defense as well as offensive measures.
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Consequently, the C-cubed system approach and SDI will
be discussed. This will complement the cruise missile
case study by allowing for additional emphasis and
clarity of arms control issues.
A. C-CUBED: A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Today, the strategic areas of concern are the
President's Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI),
vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs, and a new emphasis on
strategic command, control and communications (C-
cubed )
.
While SDI and ICBMs vulnerability are as hotly
contested as cruise missiles were a decade ago, the
aspect of the C-cubed has not drawn as much public
debate. Whether this is a product of limited knowledge
in the C-cubed arena, not as pressing as other public
issues, or due to the fact that we have an initiative
where harmony exists between arms control and defense
policy, remains to be seen. What is known is that in
1981 a Congressional Budget Office report stated:
The network that controls and would direct the
actions of the offensive forces--the command,
control. and communications, or C3, system--has
received relatively little emphasis to date, though
many strategists and analysts concur that this
critical nervous system is as sorely in need of
improvement as the offensive forces themselves.
[Ref . 18:p. ill]
Shortly after that report came out in October 1981
President Reagan initiated a sweeping program to
modernize each element of the triad, as well as the
strategic C-cubed system [Ref. 6:p. 55].
This policy should be the cause of great interest
for U.S. military officers given they have charge over
the strategic C-cubed systems. Thus, with a
background laid, and an orientation of purpose
established, this chapter will proceed to outline in
more detail the ramifications of this renewed interest
in C-cubed systems.
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Current readings In arms control point to the
failure of United States' SALT Initiatives as being
technically oriented, or analytical In nature while the
Soviets took a successful political, or as It were, a
systems approach to arms control. This may be a
simplification of the full argument, but It serves to
point out differing perspectives on the problem. In
1975, Secretary of Defense Schleslnger reported to
Congress
:
Our present C3 resources have not been
systematically designed to accommodate today's
complex C3 requirements. In general, they were
Introduced In response to specific changes In the
threat or to take advantage of a particular
technology. As a result the overall C3 system Is
not as thoroughly Integrated as It should be.
The United States' strategic C-cubed system has
similarly suffered from what some would call the
analytical method. Strategic C-cubed systems have been
viewed, modified and discussed as segments of a whole.
Rarely has It been treated In a system approach,
viewing the whole problem of command, control and
communications in its entirety. The Administration has
however has asked the military to take such a view.
Some would already label this effort a failure as In
this quote:
Despite new efforts by the Reagan administration to
elevate the priority of C3I to a level the same as
or higher than that of the (strategic) forces, no
dramatic ^shlft ^In perspective or policy has
occurred [Ref. 30].
This observation may contain some truth but it falls to
expand on the complexity of the problems and thus is
premature
.
Col. T.N. Dupuy (Ret.) in his preliminary draft of
"In Search of an American Philosophy of Command and
Control", traces the concept of command and control
(C2) to an expanded concept of command, control,
communications, computers, countermeasures , and
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Intelligence (C5I) [Ref. 31]. The analysis of his work
serves to show that the basic concepts involved in this
strategic system, what is termed C-cubed systems, are
only in their infancy. Thus the system approach can
only be helpful in gaining a picture of what the
military is tasked to come to grips with. West
Churchman is an advocate of the systems approach
convinced that it offers the solution for present-day
problems [Ref. 32]. He outlines five steps concerning
systems thinking. Following adaptation of his
principles to the specific topic at hand, this is a
listing of his five emphasis areas, which allow for a
discussion of an entity using a systems approach:
1. Objectives of the strategic C-cubed
systems (Mission requirements),
2. The C-cubed environment (domestic &
arms control & foreign threat),
3. The resources of the system (personnel
& strategic flexibility),
4. The components of the system, and
5. The management of the system.
These concepts will be used to examine United States'
C-cubed system, its present position, and where the
system needs to be in the future.
B. OBJECTIVES OF A STRATEGIC C-CUBED SYSTEM
It might be helpful to build on a basis of
definitions to arrive at what Churchman would consider
the system's objectives. The first definition is that
of strategic command and control is the military
function of supporting the Commander in Chief in his
Immediate direction of operational strategic forces
[Ref. 33]. The following quote brings up the next facet
of strategic C-cubed, the concept of communications:
"My commander in chief may make me an admiral, but only
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communications can put me in command". [Ref. 34]
Inherent in this process is having the appropriate
intelligence in which to optimally direct strategic
forces .
Thus, the strategic C-cubed system is composed of
three basic elements:
1. Intelligence systems and sensors
providing early warning and assessment.
2. Command centers with friendly and foe
forces depicted for decisionmakers to
make appropriate decisions about
responses
.
3. Supporting communication enabling the
National Command Authority ( NCA ) to get
orders out and data in. [Ref. 18:p. ix]
Within these elements the primary objectives of the
system are found to be:
1. Intelligence gathering.
2. Decision making processes based on
accurate data analysis.
3. Ability to have strategic forces
receive, execute, and respond to
orders
.
4. Have the system act as a force
multiplier in and of Itself. (Some have
appraised the current system to be
worth 20-30^ of the nominal strategic
force). [Ref. 29:p. ix]
Some cautions are necessary in looking at what seem to
be simple objectives. First,
It is very hard to draw a direct relationship
between U.S. strategic doctrine and the U.S.
strategic command and control architecture. This
is because "strategic doctrine has itself rarely
offered clear or coherent guidance for the design
and development of command-and-control systems and
procedures." also U.S. doctrine has been
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transitory from simple Ideas of MAD (Mutual AssuredDestruction) to the complex concepts of flexible
response. It is the concepts of flexible response,
countervailing strategy in a contact engagement
which burdens the command and control system.[Ref. 29:p. 6J
Secondly
,
In presenting today's multi -faceted , worldwide
picture, filtering of information is a massive
problem that frequently is ignored by those not
familiar with C2 operations. Filtering should not
present an over-simplified or unbalanced picture or
one that fails to answer the most obvious
questions. Therefore. filtered information still
tends to be of great complexity and detail, hard
for anyone to understand without lengthy study.
Advanced techniques are needed for presenting ordisplaying this information so as to hasten the
decision maker's comprehension of what is being
told. Usually advisors have to be present also to
provide expert advice the commander and answer
specialized questions, and they too need to be
filtered. [Ref. 33:p. 28J
Lastly, the environment in which the C-cubed system
must operate is vast, politically sensitive and
operates against a true threat.
It becomes very helpful in considering the system
approach to develop a model of the problem or aspect
being considered. A simple one In sketch form is
offered. A Strategic C-cubed process model might
appear as such:
Enemy--> (Surveillance/warning & situation assessment)
--> (Situational Data)--> (Decision Support)--> Orders
--> (Own Force). Then the model cycles back to
surveillance portion, etc., considering your own forces
status and actions. [Ref. 33:p. 4]
C. ENVIRON'MENTAL C-CUBED FACTORS
There are three basic environments that the
strategic C-cubed arena must be considered in,
excluding the internal inoperablli ty that it inherently
must have. These three external areas are:
1. The Soviet threat,
2. The arms control environment, and
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3. The rapidly expanding technological
environment.
Each of these will be dealt with in turn. The
author will deal with these issues in reverse order, as
they appear above. The reason is that technical
advancements in the strategic weapons field has created
an environment that has placed strategic C-cubed as a
priority issue for this Administration. Technical
advances have created a new stage of vulnerability for
the strategic C-cubed system. Simply stated, there is
growing concern that the vulnerability and extreme
importance of our strategic C-cubed systems might make
them an extremely lucrative target.
Indeed, to many knowledgeable observers, the most
troubling prospect of a Soviet first strike is not
that all of our ICBMs might be destroyed, but that
the systems supporting our retaliatory efforts
would be taken out, leaving our ^missiles sitting
harmlessly in their silos [Ref. 35].
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has spoken of a
growing C3I gap between the United States and the
Soviet Union. A gap that not only reveals the weakness
of the United States C-cubed systems but the strength
of the Soviet's system.
As many as 2,000 warheads - almost half the
weaponry distributed among our entire fleet of
nuclear subs - might be required Just to disable
the Soviet Union's advanced C3I network. Our
system, which basically relies on the same long
distance telephone lines millions used to call mom
could be ^ taken out with fewer than two dozen
warheads. [Ref. 35:p. 26]
Two dozen warheads may seem a very small number of
warheads to cause the collapse of our strategic C-cubed
system, however, other open source estimates put the
figure at two hundred or so. The conclusion is easily
made as a former Under Secretary of State once said,
"It does us little good to have a strategic deterrence
if, after a first strike, if we can't communicate with
it". [Ref. 33:p. 27] This has implications that force
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the United States to seek Increased endurance and
survivability in its strategic communication systems.
These issues will be addressed later as part of
Churchman's systems approach.
The United States has made some progress in this
area. Several years ago it was recognized that the
communications systems were not as survivable against
the present threat as were the forces (e.g., the
submarines, ICBMs and bombers). An effort was
undertaken by the defense community to identify the
communications assets most likely to survive an attack
without strategic warning. These are classified as the
Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
(MEENN). Some in the Department of Defense are
satisfied that there is a high probability that this
network has improved to the point where, in the face of
today's threat, it could maintain a line of
communication to the forces. Not all analysis of the
current situation are so positive and one can easily
see where a defensive initiative such as SDI or other
technological advances could go a long way to solve the
perceived vulnerability of the United States strategic
C-cubed systems.
The strategic C-cubed system may be examined not
only in a technological context, but also in the
context of their relationship to arms control
initiatives. Indeed, Section 36 of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Act, requires submission of Arms
Control Impact Statements (ACIS) dealing with military
support programs, with respect to this requirement,
command, control and communication programs are some of
the most significant.
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These Arms Control Impact Statements assess the
following:
1. The relationship of the C3 system to
the weapons systems they support.
2. the broad arms control implications of
the C3 systems and how they interact
with weapons systems.
There is no doubt that decisions on C3 system can have
lasting effect for the future in the acquisition and
employment issues. [Ref. 36] It is important to
realize that the arms control arena also has a great
political influence, an influence that can have a
variety of goals. Some people may desire increased
abilities in the C-cubed system to achieve
"warfighting" capabilities. Others may want advances
in safety, error checking, and detection, believing
that a safer and more controlled C-cubed system may
prevent war or at least some possible causes of war,
such as accidental launch.
The last environment that needs to be considered is
how the Soviets are expected to act in a strategic
engagement in reference to the United States C-cubed
systems
.
There are no serious considerations in the Soviet
literature of such comments as controlled and limited
war. In fact, when the United States has come out with
such policies the Soviets have refuted that such a
state can exist. In August 1980, Brezhnev said
"statements about alleged limited and partial use of
nuclear weapons have nothing in common with reality".
[Ref. 29:p. 32] Soviet strategic policy and targeting
doctrine is to the effect that any nuclear exchange
would involve simultaneous and unconstrained attacks on
a wide range of targets, which would certainly not
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exclude C3 systems [Ref. 29:p. 30]. This can be found
in a Soviet military text on Marxism-Leninism on war
and the Soviet army which states that:
Mass nuclear strikes at the armed forces of the
opponent and his key economic and political
oblectives can determine the victory of one side
and the defeat of the other at the very beginning
of the war. Therefore, a correct estimate of the
elements of the supremacy over the opponent and the
ability to use them before the opponent does, are
the key to victory in such a war. [Ref. 29:p. 30]
Soviet nuclear targeting policy follows directly from
this doctrinal refrain. In the event of a nuclear war.
Soviet strategic forces would be used massively against
a wide range of nuclear and conventional targets,
command-and-control facilities, centers of political
and administrative leadership, economic and industrial
facilities, power supplies, etc. rather than more
selectivity, in target volume or target types
[Ref. 29:p. 30].
The above statements would indicate that the
current emphasis on upgrading the survivability and
integration of C-cubed systems Is warranted, based on
perceived Soviet intentions, not merely on technical
feasibility. Consequently, one should look at the
resources that are available to allow for the
realization of an enduring and survivable system. The
resources lie largely in how people operate the C-cubed
system and the technological systems and advances which
are possible in this area. So as to not allow this
chapter to degenerate into a description of specific
systems (i.e., WWMCCS, DEW, GWEN , BMEWS , etc.) it is
sufficient to list the elements of the strategic C-
cubed systems as:
1. Voice and data communication lines,
2. Sensors,




- Air breathing: manned and unmanned
- Satellites




5. Communication equipment [Ref. 37].
The author will now look at the components of the
system, as defined by Churchman in his systems approach
outl ine
.
D. COMPONENTS OF THE C-CUBED SYSTEM
Following the system analysis as Churchman
envisioned it, it becomes necessary to revisit some
topics already covered in brief. This is a result of
looking at the components of the system which
Interpreted, means the missions or tasks that the
system must achieve to carry out the objectives of the
system. Thus the parameters discussed here, act as the





2. Allow command of strategic forces in
any circumstance giving world-wide
coverage (must allow for two way
communication )
3. Provide flexibility
4. Provide time sensitive and accurate
attack warning, attack assessments,
collect and process intelligence
Information, and decision aids
5. Have endurance potential
Comments on all of these points are warranted. The
Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR) concluded in
1978, the U.S. command, control, communications and
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intelligence (C3I) system should have much greater
endurance than the present system. At that time
endurance was thought of in terms of days to possibly a
week. Xow in 1987 endurance is discussed in terms of
months. [Ref. 29:p. 2] This change in endurance policy
came when the Reagan Administration modified the 1982
countervailing doctrine. Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger directed the United States military to
prepare to fight a contracted nuclear war. This placed
new endurance requirements on the C-cubed system. This
requirement meant that the strategic C-cubed system had
to:
1. Be sufficiently hardened to continue to
function after attack.
2. Permit rapid retargeting.
3. Provide the NCA with needed real time
reconnaissance after strikes.
4. Allow for essential two way
communication between NCA and SIOP
forces .
5. Provide a method or channel to enemy
that would permit negotiations with the
.
enemy, while the conflict ensued
[Ref. 38].
Certainly the above policy change required a
survivability previously unknown by the C-cubed system.
Thus a review of the vulnerabilities of the system was
undertaken. These vulnerabilities are of course
dependent of the particular makeup of the system. They
are also dependent on the scenario of attack that one
might contemplate. The strategic C-cubed system suffers
from all the same vulnerabilities of strategic forces
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plus those peculiar to command, control structures and











9. deficient Communication Security
10. NCA decapitation
11. satellite threats. [Ref. 29:p. 2]
Many authors have keyed on decapitation as the main
threat. Decapitation refers to killing the President
and destroying the smooth transition of power from the
President to and through the sixteen constitutionally
designated successors. Such an attack could have grave
consequences. These authors' comments are illustrated
in the following paraphrase: Decapitation has become
the most significant threat to United States nuclear
capability yet standard assessment techniques have
failed to recognize it and take appropriate measures.
This situation also undermines crisis stability biasing
the NCA to make rapid and early execution of SIOP.
This time pressure on senior military and political
authorities undermines rational assessment and
promotes miscalculations that could produce war.
[Ref. 39]
These comments must strike a realistic cord as the
following quotation would suggest. Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger Indicated that the
Administration believes its C3I plan. once
implemented, would deny the Soviets the option of
either attempting a decapitation attack, or using
protracted war tactics to exploit the limitations
of our C3 system, and would provide the UnitedStates with a C3I system compatible with our
strategy of deterrence [Ref. 30:p. 45].
The flexibility required of the system based on
possible and/or perceived strategic scenarios
complicates the measures of effectiveness used to
evaluate a C-cubed system. One can easily see why the
assessing of MOEs and the components of the strategic
C-cubed system Is so difficult. It also should show
the reasonableness and validity of taking a systems
approach in considering C-cubed needs. The analytical
approach would required this chapter to deal with the
particulars of specific systems and build outward.
This would have soon become overwhelming. The system
approach lets the discussion of all pertinent facets
of the C-cubed system progress in a manner that can be
comprehended, though it amply shows the complexity of
the coordination and workings of the physical system.
E. C-CUBED SYSTEMS: MANAGEMENT
The last area Churchman covers in his systems
analysis is what he terms management. This is broken
down into two functions. The first being planning the
system which involves all aspects of goals, objectives,
environment, use of resources and its components.
These have all been discussed enough to allow moving on
to the second function Churchman includes in his
management field. This field involves both the
execution of plans and the planning for change. The
execution of plans is outside the scope of this paper
as one could discuss targeting options, OPLANS and a
variety other options. The idea of planning for change
is what this paper is about. The Importance of the
system is begging for change. Change is needed to
secure the measure of effectiveness to allow for an
enduring system capable of operating effectively under
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the pressures of a Soviet strategic attack. It
requires vast Improvement In all functional areas of
the system. The soft nature and vulnerabilities of the
vast majority of the C-cubed systems begs for a
defensive capability. What technology cannot give In
improving the survivability of individual systems, SDI
might provide for the whole C-cubed system. This would
be possible if SDI achieves its desired end of blanket
coverage/protection of the United States. SDI then
holds the promise of a solution that bridges the full
scale of strategic concerns from decapitation to EMP
effects. All changes must be managed and directed
effectively. Steps are being taken to provide for the
necessary change, and developing a system approach to
coordinate the C-cubed arena. Some of these steps are
as follows:
1. Congress authorized creation of a new
Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I
functions
.
2. Defense Secretary Weinberger has
created a new executive committee and a
new C3I review council to coordinate
C3I planning, development and
procurement. [Ref. 38]
Such Initiatives and the research now being devoted to
the C-cubed arena will hopefully break through the
complex Issues that have limited people in the past to
a system by system look at C-cubed concerns. Past
efforts in their fragmented approach cannot be
effective for strategic forces in the scenarios of
conflict currently seen as possible. A systems
approach would also serve the arms control community in
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any negotiations that might call for agreements
limiting the vulnerability of strategic C-cubed
systems
.
The military is uniquely capable of providing a
system perspective concerning defense issues as well as
arms control concerns. The military has the
responsibility for defense, controls developing
technologies, manages and operates the majority of
strategic C-cubed systems, and can assess arms control
impacts far better than any other constituted
organization. The military has the ability to control
strategic systems from development, production, up to
deployment, with consistency in doctrine through to
execution of any eventual employment.
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V. CRITICAL CONCEPTS
The last chapter discussed the strategic C-cubed
arena from a systems approach and why the military is
uniquely qualified to provide for such an approach in
the strategic and arms control arenas. There are
other concepts that need further explanation or
emphasis to provide a balanced view of arms control
issues and concerns. With the previous portions of
this paper providing ample background the issues will
not be discussed in quite the same depth as C-cubed
systems. An effort will be made to blend comments of
this chapter with previous material to allow for
conclusions and summaries to be drawn by section.
A. TECHNOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT
It is important to understand terms when discussing
technology. "Technology is neither science nor
products, but rather a system of knowledge which
converts theory to hardware" [Ref. 40]. Often
technology is given a wider application or meaning and
conjures up thoughts of the complete research and
development (R&D) field. R&D has three basic
components those being science, technology, and
products. These components are not necessarily tied to
a force structure or supportive of a particular
doctrine etc. The R&D structure is tasked
...to develop and to preserve options, which may or
may not be taken up. The purpose of R&D is to buy
options. Its precise purpose is to reduce the time
that would be required before the achievement of an
operational capability. The low costs of
preproduction R&D are accepted as insurance against
future military demand .. .without any commitment to
force structure. [Ref. 41]
The actual selection of weapon systems can influence
all other components of military power: strategy,
military operations, manpower, logistics, and training.
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Consequently, today the technology available to choose
from plays a large part In allowing the United States
meet it's military preparedness mission.
There are several technological themes that are
apparent today.
1. The choice of high over low technology
weapons
.
2. Gaining technological superiority as
the goal of the superpowers.
3. Military establishments opting for
incremental gains rather then giant
technological gains.
4. Consideration of human aspects of C-
cubed throughout technological
development [Ref. 42].
All these themes merit comment other than the fourth
area having already been sufficiently developed in
chapter IV, but worthy of relisting. It is the
author's opinion that technology is a factor in
securing the national interest, but only a factor.
The following quote summarizes the author's existing
feel ings
.
At the heart of East-West tension lies, not
technology, but a variety of far more fundamental,
and far more intractable, causes having ultimately
to do with the profound differences between the two
great alliance systems and the social, political,
economic and value structures they exemplify
[Ref. 43].
If technology is not the source of friction between
the superpowers but merely a factor, then is it the
United States' answer in its quest for security? The
United States has opted for the high technology and
though heavily relied upon it is not a panacea.
...technological superiority by itself does not
translate directly into military superiority:
weapons designed to exploit a lower level of
tecnnology may be as effective as more
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sophisticated weapons when produced in quantity andintegrated with an appropriate military doctrine[RefT 44].
Technological innovation in either low or high tech
varieties offers an important means of achieving
surprise. It is surprise that gives one a marked
strategic advantage in warfare. Technology acts then
as a complicating parameter in the security world where
an innovation (whether high or low technology) may have
strategic implications.
Technology not only changes the relationship of
individual fighters to their foe. but even makes
the whole purpose of preparation for war, on a
general level, much more sophisticated and
emanding. The massive increases in weapon range
and lethality described above have led national
leaders to focus on the deterrence of war as the
?rimary aim of warfighting capabilities...
echnology has caused most of America's military
effort to be organized around the idea of a
permanent threat, one to be deterred, not
confronted, because the consequences are too awful.
[Ref. 42:p. 92]
The gaining of technological superiority remains
the goal of the superpowers as it may afford a
strategic windfall, whether using high or low
technological methods. This begs the question as to
how ready and how capable are the military
establishments in dealing with technological
breakthroughs
.
The cruise missile case study would indicate that
at times technology can out pace the practical or the
strategic use of such technologies until policy and
acceptance are found or legislated. Much of the
problem lies in the acquisition process in the United
States. Critics of the Department of Defense
acquisition process complain that the acquisition
process is debilitating, void of military strategy, and
operational concepts. It is argued that technology is
supreme and the military even shows a reluctance for
technologies that upset doctrines or existing
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structures. What is needed, it is argued, is that no
element should be supreme but all should work in
harmony to achieve national security goals [Ref. 42:p.
157]. There must be an integration of military,
technological, and operational strategy. Presently, in
DoD there is as much competition and conflict as
rationality and cooperation. Politics and
bureaucratic processes are a large part of the
equation. This is not to say that the DoD does not do
better than many other organizations. It merely
states that improvement is warranted. The key then is
to achieve some sort of effective dialogue between
those elements allowing for the fashioning of
consistent war concepts and policies [Ref. 42:p. 171].
Though there may be internal problems in DoD that need
to be worked on to achieve a harmony of purpose, it is
the author's feeling that DoD is in a better position
to generate consistent strategic nuclear doctrine then
the institutions presently employed. Currently, the
United States' efforts in this area can be
characterized as Desmond Ball has observed:
An examination of ... different facets of American
strategic nuclear policy reveals the lack of a
coherent or consistent overall direction in that
policy .... Both the actual levels of U.S. strategic
forces and the characteristics of the particular
weapons systems ... have been more determined by
bureaucratic/political outcomes that by any
rational analysis of U.S. strategic requirements.
[Ref. 45]
Now technology has been discussed a final
observation is warranted as it concerns technology and
its relationship to arras control.
...for many reasons arms control negotiations aimed
at military R&D rather than deployed weapons, seem
almost certain to fail; even the frequent
suggestion of indirect control via a ban on weapons
tests has serious drawbacks as an arms control
technique. Therefore, it seems only prudent to
evaluate constantly our military R&D program in the
context of our own decisions, without relying on
73
any mutual restraint on the part of the Soviet Union,however welcome that would be.
[Ref. 44:p. 176]
As earlier quoted:
Technology has caused most of America's military
effort to be organized around the idea of a
permanent threat, one to be deterred, not
confronted, because the consequences are too awful
[Ref. 42:p. 92J.




The concept of deterrence is familiar to most
people though not its pitfalls and true scope.
Deterrence by definition means preventing certain types
of contingencies from arising. Thus deterrence
involves a forecast of costs and risks of associated or
anticipated actions [Ref. 27:p. 25]. The United
States* first stated national security goal in part
says that the military must have the ability to
safeguard the United States, its forces and allies by
deterring aggression [Ref. 6:p. 42]. One pitfall is
mirror imaging as some analysts believe the United
States has been guilty of. It can be stated as "we
developed a deterrent that would deter us if we were
Russians, but which would not necessarily deter the
Russians". [Ref. 46] Deterrence not only must act to
discourage aggression but also the political
encroachment of our national interests. The ability of
the Soviets to pressure other governments to act in
accordance with their will is part of the larger scope
that deterrence must include. This idea is expressed
in the following quote:
War is then not necessary for the Soviets because
the threat of military action is enough to cause
accommodation. In our defense planning Jargon, we
call these virtual wars -- wars that don't actually
occur, but the expectation of the probable outcome
brings about that outcome. Deterrence needs to work
against virtual wars, too. [Ref. 47]
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It should be remembered that deterrence is a
political concept. Military strategy deals with the
military actions one would take if deterrence fails.
As a political concept, and in that sphere
Deterrence is inadequate as a foreign policy.
There is a ereat range of enemy action that we
seek (to deter) far more than (Just) security-however vital It may be--there remains a vast field
where deterrence has no utility at all. In areas
where the communists cannot be efficiently deterred
we must create the conditions which will nullify
their strategies. In areas where the opportunity
exists to enhance the general welfare we must as
surely act. Indeed, here must be the heart of our
policy, with deterrence^as its discreet, powerful,
and versatile guardian. [Ref. 27:p. 42]
To be effective politically, the United States must
persuade the Soviets
...that we have the capability to act; that, in
acting, we could inflict costs greater than the
advantages to be won from attaining their
objective; and that we really would act as
specified in the stated contingency
[Ref. 27:p. 26].
To do so effectively, US strategic defenses must meet
four tests.
1. Survivability: The United States must
be able to absorb a preemptive attack
with sufficient strength to inflict on
the enemy losses that he perceives to
be intolerable.
2. Credibility: The enemy must believe we
have the military capability to carry
out our threatened response.
3. Political Will: The enemy must believe
we have the political will to carry out
our threatened response.
4. Clarity: The action to be deterred
must be clear to our enemies that it is
prohibited.
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One final thought one should always remember Is
that deterrence does not Itself guarantee that nations
will act rationally. Many experts believe that the
balance of terror is not as important as the balance of
power with the political advantages it can give the
owner in peace and crisis environments.
If deterrence is working one can credit it with a
certain amount of stability, but how much is the real
question. This aspect will be considered in the next
section
.
C. STABILITY: SURVIVABILITY / CAPABILITY
The premise that stability Is a paramount factor in
the arms control arena has been stated numerous times.
It is summed up as follows: "Stability of a higher
level (of nuclear armaments) is preferable to
instability at a lower level". [Ref. 48]
What has not been discussed are the two basic
components which create stability, in a strategic
sense. These components are survivability and
capability, and are determined in analysis of opposing
forces'. The question of survivability and capability
is in a large measure a product of a nation's overall
strategic doctrine and armament level.
The next section will make further comment on
specific U.S. strategies and how they impact on the
variables of survivability, capability and doctrinal
soundness
.
The bottom line in any discussion of survivability
and capability is that survivability is the most
important quality contributing to stability, for
capability without survivability Is unstable. This is
the premise that, if true, seems little supported in
the present agreements the United States complies with
today. A look at arms control agreements today as
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characterized by attributes of survivability and
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4. Promptness of delivery
5 Throw-weight
[Ref. 49]
The above table paints a disturbing picture one
that seems to confirm the following quotation from a
Rand Corporation study:
American strategic thinking--born predominately of
civilian defense specialists bearing legal,
technical and distinctly non-military intellectual
outlooks--is deeply rooted in the proposition that
nuclear war is unwinnable in any practical
sense... it has also produced an increasingly
predominant belief that deterrence stability (hence
U.S. security) is best served by a strategic
environment of mutual vulnerability. The Soviets
relect "mutual vulnerability" out of hand as an
abdication of political responsibility. [Ref. 50]
Vulnerability can only be equated to stability in a
MAD concept, though this seems very hollow if indeed
mutual vulnerability is rejected by the Soviets. The
Scowcroft Commission reported:
Encouraging stability by giving incentives to move
" > • vulnerabl" -^---' -^~ -• -toward less
important than reducing q







In effect this gave priority to force restructuring
over force reduction as the primary means of enhancing
stability.
It is appropriate to provide a simplistic scenario
to capture the essence of what is being discussed. We
shall assume two opposing nations each possess six
nuclear missiles for their strategic defense. The
physical characteristics and capability of these
missiles would require two missiles to be targeted
against an opposing missile silo to ensure destruction
of the silo. In this case there is stability as a
first strike would allow for a second strike of three
missiles against what would be then an unprotected
enemy. If the rules were changed such that one missile
could kill another missile, then an exchange could
leave no one as a clear winner unless surprise was
absolute. Thus stability is still greatly encouraged
in disregarding the exact postures and capabilities of
each nation's systems.
Things change radically if in the scenario the
countries possessed MIRVed missiles. If in the example
each of these missiles has a capacity to destroy three
opposing missiles, we predict a new outcome. In this
scenario under ideal conditions, it would take Just two
MIRVed missiles to destroy the other nations silo-based
missiles and would allow for twelve other warheads to
be targeted Independently, allowing for a great
possibility for instability.
One can argue that in the last scenario that
capability still plays a role in the destabilizing
effect. Capability can be shown to be less important
then survivability however, by changing the force
structures. Country "A" has eighteen unMIRVed missiles
capable of destroying one enemy silo each. Country "B"
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has the six MIRVed missiles capable of knocking out
three enemy silos each. Here capabilities greatly
differ but stability is likely to be high, where
surprise cannot be achieved. In fact it is Just as
stable, as the scenario where each nation was given six
missiles, each of which could destroy one missile silo,
though at a higher armament level. [Ref. 49] Of
course the ultimate arms control aim is stated as
fol lows
:
We seek US-Soviet force configurations that are
both crisis stable, that is, there is no incentive
for either side to strike first, even during deep
crisis, and arms race stable, that is these force
structures are such they do not encourage either
side to engage in successive rounds "^ __-.---.-. ^—
weapons deployments [Ref. 2:p. 150].
Strategic force survivability will enhance
stability and deterrence. The utility of such force
planning is clear and predictable. The present
administration has sought to Increase not only the
numbers of U.S. forces and their chance of surviving a
Soviet strike, but also their destructive capability,
endurance, and responsiveness [Ref. 51].
It is, however obvious that not every way of
decreasing a country's strategic force
vulnerability can contribute to the stability of
deterrence. In theory, a very radical and
comprehensive Increase in the survivability of the
forces of one side is tantamount to an increase in
the exposure of the other side's forces. The party
that feels it has been "left behind" would have to
take urgent steps to catch up in second-strike
force survivability or revert to other measures
designed to restore the mutuality of deterrence.
Certain ways of misleading the opponent as to the
real balance of forces also belong to these methods
of ensuring stability while, in fact, undermining
it. [Ref. ?0:p. 87]
The above quote brings the topic of SDI to mind. This
thought must be placed in context. The Soviets have
been conducting similar work over a longer period of
time with greater monetary investments. The
feasibility and deployment of SDI technology might be
classified as a radical breakthrough.
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Only radical breakthroughs can be trulydestabilizing. Most experts point first to thepossibility of a qualitative leap in defensive
strategic systems, the development of which has
long lagged behind that of offensive systems.
[Ref. 50:p. 87].
The possibility of the Soviets achieving such a
breakthrough first must in the United States eyes pose
a condition of the greatest concern, on the other hand
if the United States were first to deploy these
advanced defensive technologies it would gain a vast
amount of deterrence power, indeed, the most powerful
type of deterrence, that of deterrence by denial.
Deterrence by denial is the most powerful form of
deterrence as the following quote illustrates.
...the first distinction is between "deterrence by
threat of retaliation" and "deterrence by denial".
The former conveys to the enemy the idea that we
cannot prevent him from destroying what he wishes
to destroy, but we can make him wish he had never
done so. The latter conveys the idea to the enemy
that, despite his best efforts , he would fail to
achieve his objective. [Ref. 20:p. 13 J
.
It is obvious which deterrent form is better.
The discussion of stability and how survivability
affects It must naturally lead to a discussion of the
strategic doctrine of a nation. This paper has
introduced some of the current strategic doctrinal
concepts. The next section will review some of these
concepts in more detail and suggest what type of
doctrinal approach the United States should take in
the future.
D. BALANCED OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
The research that has led to the writing of this
paper has convinced the author that the United States
needs a balanced deterrent policy. A balanced
strategic strategy would be based on denial deterrence
and have both offensive and defensive capabilities.
Those capabilities should be developed to the extent
that any offense strike by the Soviets would be an
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unsuccessful attack, the United States being able to
follow up such provocations with retaliation of an
order that could if desired destroy the Soviets
strategic forces and other Soviet valued targets.
Ideally, if the defensive system was significantly
ironclad, punitive retaliation or the idea of punitive
deterrence would not have to be resorted to.
The primary virtues of denial over punitive
deterrence are in the fact that denial provides for
damage limitation in two ways. First, by protection
against and also by attrition of incoming offensive
weapons [Ref. 52]. This new idea has come to take its
place among the three major schools of strategic
thought that are alive today. These being:
1 . MAD
2. Counterforce or Countervalue
3. A Balanced offensive-defensive approach
MAD as you will recall from the previous
discussions comes as a result of each side possessing
nuclear retaliatory forces and vulnerable homelands.
The problem with MAD is that it assumes people will act
rationally. If war does break out there are limited
options in escalations. It is interesting to note that
Japan is said to have entered World War II as a result
of feeling they had nothing to loose as their culture
was on the verge of economic collapse. Lastly, MAD
fails as a strategic doctrine as it does not meet the
broad range of deterrence responsibilities that the
United States is faced with today. [Ref. 52:p. 168]
The Soviets have made clear through their actions
that they reject the Western doctrine of mutually
assured destruction (MAD) and reject the notion
that nuclear war is suicide [Ref. 46:p. 31J.
It should also be remembered that MAD was also an
economic strategy, in that it was easier and took less
missiles to hold the USSR's populace hostage then to
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try to target and destroy military targets. MAD,
however, still exists as a strategic line of thought
for some people. People often support it today by
pointing to the fact that MAD from its conception has
"worked", in the sense that the United States has not
experienced a nuclear war. More thoughtful people
would hold this is a "high risk, all-or-nothing
strategy. As long as it works it is fine, but if it
fails it guarantees apocalypse. [Ref. 34:p. 106]
Advances in the technological attributes and U.S.
strategic force structure allowed for the feasibility
of a counterforce strategy. Counterforce targeting was
a moral and conceptual step up in strategic defensive
doctrine. The assumptions that form the basis for a
counterforce targeting strategy are as follows:
1. An enemy is deterred by your ability
and will to defeat him militarily on
the battlefield.
2. Decisionmaking does not depend a
rational decision making model since it
is the ability to defeat the enemy that
deters his aggression.
3. Targeting is based on targeting the
enemy's means to achieve his
objectives
.
4. Escalation is not necessarily automatic
therefore, credible deterrence requires
flexibility, controllability, and
selectivity.
5. Nuclear superiority if it can be
achieved is meaningful as forces over
and above those needed for "assured
destruction" can be applied toward
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threatening military defeat should
deterrence fail. [Ref. 53]
Along with the technology that allowed accurate
targeting came an ability to support a Counterforce
strategy as new command, control and communication
systems developed. [Ref. 20:p. 3] These technological
changes as well as others saw a natural transition from
MAD to the concept of flexible response that in its
refined state became the counterforce doctrine the
U.S. has today. A doctrine which is more in harmony
with the capabilities of the nations strategic
weaponry, and C-cubed capabilities.
Today, many scholars hold that the United States is
seeing another natural transition. A transition into
a balanced offensive-defensive strategy that can be
technologically supported in terms of progress with
SDI.
A Congressional Budget Office report stated the
transition this way:
The United States is currently engaged in
substantial expansion and modernization of the
nation's strategic nuclear forces. Those efforts
have been accompanied by a revelation of military
doctrine that would govern use of nuclear weapons
in the event of attack. That evolving new doctrine
implies that Soviet aggression can no longer be
deterred by a U.S. arsenal that is only capable of
prompt and large-scale retaliation, but must also
be prepared to sustain nuclear combat of various
scales and durations. [Ref. 18:p. ill]
They went on to say:
The now superseded doctrine, centered around the
concept of "mutually assured destruction"
- deterrence must derive, it is argued, from the
United States' ability to deal with a wide range of
potential threats, with responses tailored to the
provocation [Ref. 18:p. xij.
The US defense community with respect to its strategic
national security missions should recognize frankly
the domain of uncertainty that it operates in. It is
true that DoD is tasked with the mission to deter
83
nuclear war and, If need be, conduct military
operations. In a situation for which there Is no close
precedent. It Is difficult to affirm with confidence
that careful postural and STOP design will have any
marked effect upon the quality of pre- and Intra- war
deterrence, or even upon the outcome of a general war
nevertheless planning Is considered essential.
[Ref. 13:p. 189]
Regardless of the STOP design preferred, there Is
an absolute need for the United States to be able
to limit damage to Itself. Indeed, a good deal of
the potential value of a wel 1 -designed nuclear
employment policy will be negated, or undermined.
If American society Is totally In a hostage status.
[Ref. 54]
This ultimate need for damage limitation Is today
only answered In the prospects of SDI . This Is
especially true when one considers the following quote
found In Soviet Military Strategy which says;
...as In most Soviet literature as well, there are
not to be found signs of serious professional
Interests In concepts like controlled response and
restrained nuclear targeting, which have been
discussed In the West [Ref. 50:p. 277].
The above quote seems to suggest the Soviets initiation
of nuclear war would take on a massive rather than
controlled nature. Thus when the United States started
shifting, in the 1970's from deterrence to a
"warf ightlng" or counterforce strategy, it was based
upon a realization that if deterrence falls you have to
be able to fight. The policy however did not go far
enough to ensure protection or some damage limitation
of the United States. In fairness it probably went as
far as technology would then allow. United States'
doctrine during this transition has emphasized the
capability for limited strategic options,
countermilitary and counterpolitical control targeting,
postattack continuity of government, and the potential
for waging a prolonged nuclear conflict. Thus the
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warfighting charge has risen out of the targeting
policy used to support the strategic doctrine of
counter force
.
The essential need for damage limitation and the
counterforce strategy go against the MAD concept
approach which envisages deterrence to be based upon
mutual societal vulnerability [Ref. 55]. These
policies do however describe the adequate approach to
take to ensure deterrence, today. The U.S. must
consider strategic defensive forces and damage
limitation. Such defensive concepts need to be
balanced with offensive capabilities of the present
counterforce strategic force structure.
This balanced strategy is available to minimize the
vulnerability of the American homeland and grant
success to any retaliatory strike requirement. It
should be noted that a defended US would ensure the US
standing by its allies more closely. A balanced
deterrent based upon a mix of offensive and defensive
forces would make it much harder for the Soviets to
upset the "correlation of forces" during the first
phase of a central nuclear war.
Arms control can do much to smooth the transition
of the United States into a balanced
offensive-defensive strategic defense if properly
conceived and negotiated.
It was the arms control community that initially
sought the creation of defensive weapons so as to
reduce the need for vast amounts of offensive weapons.
That concept proved to be unrealistic, as technology
could not support an effective defensive system.
Today, SDI promises to do what was envisioned years
ago, that of reducing the worth of offensive weapons
and hopefully as a result, the numbers kept. Indeed,
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SDI might be better if It proves initially to be good
only against limited attacks (i.e., light ones), or
accidental launchings and therefore cannot easily be
considered by the Soviets as a part of U.S. offensive
strategy
.
Some critics oppose SDI on the basis that the US
has abandoned deterrence for defense. This is wrong,
as there is no choice between defense and deterrence as
defense itself deters and in essence a defense
fortifies deterrence in a way that can actually reduce
the risks of war. SDI therefore should not be
considered a "bargaining chip" as SDI could actually
lower the value of offensive weapons. Even at the time
of Secretary of Defense McNamara the value of a
defense system was seen. McNamara was quoted as
follows
:
It is important that none of the (ABM) systems at
the present or foreseeable state of the art would
grovide an impenetrable shield over the United
tates. Were such a shield possible, we would
certainly want it--and we would certainly build
it.... If we could build and deploy a genuinely
impenetrable shield over the United States, we
would be willing to spend not $40 billion (in 1967
dollars!) but any reasonable multiple of that
amount that was necessary. The money in itself is
not the problem; the penetrability of ^the proposed
shield is the problem. [Ref. 42:p. 148]
Thus defensive emphasis would be preferable to the
existing nuclear hostage relationship between
superpowers
.
SDI could also act as insurance for the United
States against the Soviets cheating, as any offensive
arms reductions makes the threshold of cheating more
important. It is this threshold of cheating that forms




E. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE
Soon after being elected, President Reagan
reaffirmed the necessary requirements for successful
arms control initiatives. He pledged his








4. enhanced security, and
5. effective verification.
There is great reason that verification was placed in
the above list of requirements. President Reagan's
Administration has placed great emphasis on this issue
as it relates to arms control issues. It has grown to
take on new meaning and any discussion of verification
now also includes realistic thoughts reference
compliance. With the introduction of more smaller and
dual capable weapons, such as cruise missiles,
verification will become increasingly harder and
counting ceilings and sub-ceilings like those found in
SALT I & II could become meaningless. This reality
exists even in the face of anticipated technical
advances in national technical means of intelligence
gathering.
Verification of arms control agreements acts as a
deterrent to the extent that a violator is concerned
with abiding by signed agreements even if that might
affect the national self-interest, or fears based on
the consequence of violation detection. If there is no
fear of detection or the consequences of detection then
national selfinterest may cause a nation to violate
agreements which they have entered into. There might
also be reason to enter agreements with the
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foreknowledge that a nation does not Intend to abide by
It. The Reagan Administration has charged and
substantiated these very types of violations of arms
control agreements that the Soviets have entered into
with the United States. Thus today verification Issues
must incorporate a response to violations to be
effective
.
In entering into arms control agreement a nation
needs to know their capabilities of detection and also
what that nation will be politically, legally and
militarily able to respond to. Recent experience with
the Soviets has shown that they are deterred from
violations only if the actions upon discovery might be
so disastrous as to outweigh an advantage of
noncompliance. The bottom line is that a nation
contemplating a violation may not be deterred if it can
discourage, circumvent or absorb the reaction of
discovery of a violation. In order to deal with Soviet
arms control violations the United States must first be
willing to expose the violation. This may not be an
easy decision as acknowledging violations may
Jeopardize intelligence sources which could have
greater consequences then the violation Itself. If
this hurdle is passed, a violation may not be exposed
because the United States is not willing politically,
militarily or for some other reason to respond to the
violation. A unique reality of today is also a
requirement to consult with a nation's allies, which
likewise may be determined to be unwise for a variety
of reasons. Thus the reader can see that verification
is a complex issue. Verification exists to
substantiate that agreements are being complied with
...for one side to adhere and for the other side
not to adhere does not constitute real arms control
at all. Rather it constitutes a dangerous form of
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unilateral disarmament In the disguise of bilateral
arms control [Ref. 56].
In such a state the arms control process soon
breaks down. The President's Report to Congress of
Soviet Non-Compliance forms a basis for this break down
or at least poses a caution sign in dealing with the
Soviets. The reader may still question why there
should be compliance problems when arms control
agreements have been signed. A review of the arms
control process lends clarity and possibly an answer to
this question.
First consider why a nation may be prompted to
initiate an arms control proposal. Certainly, there
may be legitimate interest but there may also be
propaganda motives, a desire to play to or mold the
feelings of the public and political forces in an
opposing nation. A proposal might pacify domestic
concerns or be a part of an image building campaign to
name Just a few reasons why a nation may initiate arms
control initiatives. In the arms control negotiating
phase arms control may be pursued for reasons other
than true arms control. This phase provides excellent
intelligence gathering potential, a rare opportunity to
carry out an active disinformation campaign. The
process can also buy valuable time lulling opponents
into a false sense of security, found in the hopes of
the arms control proposals themselves. A nation may
even conclude an agreement and sign it hoping to codify
the status quo, buy time, stop development of
technologies by an enemy, etc. Compliance may come
about as a way to put resources in other areas, induce
reciprocal compliance out of fear of sanctions if
violations are discovered or based upon a fundamental
belief in the agreement and the responsibilities of
signing an accord. With regards to the Soviets it
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seems their greatest interest in arms control has been
during periods of intense threat. These periods and
issues are noted:
1. 1927-30 Japanese and German threat
2. Early 1970s US ABM threat
3. Late 1980s SDI threat. [Ref. 57]
The United States should proceed with arms control
initiatives with a full understanding of the Soviet
Union's record of compliance to arms control
agreements. The United States should also realize that
upon recognizing arms control violations there are but
five recourses:
1. Do nothing.
2. Threaten to withdraw/abrogate the
treaty if the violation is not
resolved
.
3. Abrogate the treaty or the violated
portions of the agreement.
4. Take other appropriate sanctions.
5. Proceed with a military build up to
offset the advantage gained by any
violation. [Ref. 57]
There is no question that arms control can promote
US security by placing limits on Soviet forces, making
the military's Job of predicting Soviet abilities
easier. The problem for policymakers is to determine
how much risk of non-compliance can be taken to achieve
what is signed in the formal agreement. Ultimately it
is a total package that must be weighed. Stated in





The term reflection is appropriate to summarize
this paper as it has taken an inter-disciplinary
approach (National Security Affairs and Joint Command,
Control and Communication perspectives )--analyzing the
role and parameters those in the military command
establishment should have with regards to arms control
initiatives as they affect U.S. strategic nuclear policy.
Ideally the reader now has an appreciation of the
complexity of Issues that surround arms control issues.
This understanding should also reveal how uniquely
qualified the military is to handle a larger role in
the arms control community. Such a role would bring
about the harmony of national security issues and those
of arms control
.
The cruise missile case study as well as the C-
cubed analysis should have demonstrated the virtue of a
systems approach to arms control issues. Issues that
must never lead national security policy but be
supportive of the Nation's strategic doctrine. One
should also appreciate the need for evolutionary or, if
possible, revolutionary change in strategic doctrine
answering changes in technology and stability issues.
This is not to say that technology must lead the
formation of arms control processes, on the contrary
the technological issue is Just one of many that the
political arms control environment must deal with. As
presented earlier In this paper, the essential nature
of war is a continuation of politics and does not
change with changing technology or armaments. Arms
control must be based on political agreements not
merely technical discussions before arms control can be
successful . Any arms control agreement should avoid
constraints in detail on force structures and should
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not limit measures which may enhance survivability.
Each side must be able to unilaterally decide how to
increase stability in the context of its strategic
defense needs.
The United States must align its strengths against
enduring Soviet weaknesses and adopt competitive
strategies to force the Soviets to perform less
efficiently or effectively militarily, thus making the
Soviets more willing to seek and abide in meaningful
arms control agreements.
The warning must be that with the Soviets pursuing
political and military objectives in arms control
agreements, we have to continue a dual track
concept of negotiation, as well as weapondevelopment and enhancement [Ref. 8:p. 18].
The author quotes the conclusions of another
contemporary author:
In sum, the trends in relative military strength
are such that, unless we move promptly to reverse
them, the United States is moving toward a posture
of minimum deterrence in which we would be
conceding to the Soviet Union the potential for a
military and political victory if deterrence
failed. While it is probably not possible and may
not be politically desirable for the Untied States
to strive for a nuclear-war-winning capability,
there are courses of action available to the United
States whereby we could deny to the Soviets such a
capability and remove the one-sided instability
caused by their throw-weight advantage and by their
defense program. [Ref- 27:p. 113]
To the author the most promising future course
available to the United States is one that develops SDI
technologies and with them forms a balanced defensive-
offensive strategic defense doctrine. That future will
not be secured without a greater military involvement
in arms control issues.
It is clear that (the involvement of) the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and senior elements of the armed
forces must be given a larger role in arms control
planning and the negotiations themselves. This not
only means giving the armed services a larger




ter military responsibility for arms control
foster greater harmony between defense and
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